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WEED WARS: WINNING THE FIGHT 
AGAINST MARIJUANA SPILLOVER FROM 
NEIGHBORING STATES 
Jessica Berch* 
Today, a “novel social and economic experiment[]”† involving the sale, use, 
and distribution of marijuana is sweeping the nation. Despite a federal ban on 
the drug, states have begun to legalize medical and even recreational marijuana 
use. While these entrepreneurial states push forward with marijuana legalization, 
other states and the federal government remain opposed to the expansion of ma-
rijuana use or its legalization in any form. 
Regardless of one’s position on the merits of marijuana legalization, the fed-
eralism and conflict-of-laws issues that arise from this multi-state experiment de-
serve scholarly attention. In particular, non-legalizing states that border more 
permissive neighbors have begun to see an upsurge in marijuana use within their 
borders—and an attendant increase in crime and accidents—and these states 
need ways to protect themselves. In a previous Article, I proposed that non-
legalizing states enact laws modeled on Dram Shop Acts, which create liability 
against those who sell alcohol to already intoxicated people who then injure 
third-party victims. These aptly named “Gram Shop Acts” would create liability 
against out-of-state marijuana dispensaries that sell to Home State buyers who, 
while high, injure third parties in the Home State or residents of the Home State. 
Three challenges to the viability and success of this mode of protection arise. 
First, will the courts of the non-legalizing state have personal jurisdiction over 
the out-of-state sellers? Second, as a matter of conflict of laws, will those courts 
apply their laws, particularly the Gram Shop Act, to the dispute? Finally, would 
the non-legalizing state’s use of its own laws comport with the requirements of 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the dormant 
Commerce Clause? This Article explores these horizontal federalism issues ema-
nating from the legalization quagmire. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Reefer madness has been set ablaze. Over the past few decades, states have 
increasingly joined California in legalizing first medical and now recreational 
marijuana. As of August 2018, thirty-one states have legalized marijuana in 
some form,1 and more than half the nation supports that trend.2 
The path toward state legalization has not been all highs; there have been 
some crashes. After California became the first state to legalize medical mari-
juana in 1996, the US Supreme Court stepped in and upheld Congress’s author-
ity to regulate even entirely personal use within a state.3 Some thought that the 
Supreme Court’s pronouncement spelled the end of the legalization experiment 
                                                        
1  See ALASKA STAT. §§ 17.37.010–17.37.080, 17.38.010 (2018); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 36-2801–36-2819 (2018); ARK. CONST. amend. XCVIII, §§ 1–25; CAL. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE § 11362.1 (West 2018); COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16; CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 21a-408a (2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 4903A (2018); D.C. CODE § 7-1671.02 
(2018); FLA. CONST. art. X, § 29; HAW. REV. STAT. § 329-122 (2018); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
130/1–999 (2018); LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:1046 (2018); ME. STAT. tit. 22, §§ 2421–4230-B 
(2018); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 13-3301.1 (West 2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94G 
§§ 1–17 (2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 333.26421–333.26430 (2018); MINN. STAT. 
§§ 152.21–152.37 (2018); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-46-301–50-46-345 (2017); NEV. REV. 
STAT. §§ 453A.010–453A.810 (2017); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 126-X:1–126-X:11 (2018); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 24:6I-1–24:6I-16 (West 2018); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 26-2B-1–26-2B-7 
(2018); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3362 (McKinney 2018); N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-24.1-01–
19-24.1-40 (2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3796.01–3796.30 (West 2018); OKLA. STAT. 
tit. 63, §§ 420–426 (2018); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 475b.005–475b.548 (2018); 35 PA. CONS. 
STAT. §§ 10231.101–10231.2110 (2018); 21 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 21-28.6-1–21-28.6-17 
(2018); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 4472–4474m (2018); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 69.51A.005–
69.51A.900 (2018); W. VA. CODE § 16a-1-1–16a-16-1 (2018); H.B. 823, Reg. Sess. (La. 
2018); H. 3932, 189th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2016). 
2  See Alex Kreit, The Federal Response to State Marijuana Legalization: Room for Com-
promise?, 91 OR. L. REV. 1029, 1037 (2013) (“[W]hile Americans remain split roughly 
evenly in their views on marijuana legalization, a sizable majority believes states should 
have the option to pursue legalization laws without federal interference.”). 
3  Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005). 
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and that the federal law criminalizing marijuana, the Controlled Substances Act 
of 1970 (“CSA”),4 would be read to preempt state medical marijuana laws.5 
But just as garden weeds, once they have taken root, do not die easily, nor 
did this weed. So, today, the United States has sown an uncomfortable patch-
work of marijuana laws. The federal government regulates marijuana as a Class 
I drug (the worst kind) and criminalizes marijuana’s growth, use, and posses-
sion.6 The federal government shows few signs of mellowing on this anti-
marijuana stance. First, on May 1, 2017, Attorney General Jeff Sessions sent a 
letter to Congress urging it to undo protections for state marijuana businesses;7 
then, on January 4, 2018, Sessions issued a memorandum reiterating that mari-
juana is illegal under federal law, and urging that federal prosecutors weigh “all 
relevant considerations” when seeking to file charges—including marijuana 
charges.8 Perhaps, though, Congress may protect states’ rights to blaze into the 
marijuana haze. On June 7, 2018, a group of bipartisan legislators introduced a 
bill to protect legalizing states from federal interference.9 
 Some states fall in line with federal regulations and fully criminalize can-
nabis; other states have decriminalized its use; still others have legalized medi-
cal use; and, finally, some states have fully legalized marijuana.10 Because of 
these differing laws, the United States faces “one of the most important federal-
ism conflicts in a generation.”11 This federalism conflict has both vertical and 
horizontal aspects, which Professor Denning termed “Diagonal Federalism”: 
                                                        
4  Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 
Stat. 1236 (1970) (codified as 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971 (2012)). 
5  Debra Yvonne Hughes, The Supremacy Clause Disappears in a Puff of Smoke—The Effort 
of Medical Marijuana Supporters to Circumvent Federal Law in United States v. Oakland 
Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative, 26 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 131, 155–61 (2001); Robert A. 
Mikos, Preemption Under the Controlled Substances Act, 16 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 5, 
6–7 (2013). 
6  21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971. 
7  See Letter from Jeff B. Sessions III, Att’y Gen., to Mitch McConnell, Majority Leader, 
U.S. Senate, Charles Schumer, Minority Leader, U.S. Senate, Paul Ryan, Speaker, U.S. 
House of Rep. and Nancy Pelosi, Minority Leader, U.S. House of Rep. (May 1, 2017), 
https://www.scribd.com/document/351079834/Sessions-Asks-Congress-To-Undo-Medical-
Marijuana-Protections [https://perma.cc/5M6J-8WVX]. 
8  See Memorandum from Jeff B. Sessions III, Att’y Gen., to All United States Att’ys (Jan. 4, 
2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1022196/download [https://perma.cc/V 
44Y-B3N2]. 
9  STATES Act, S. 3032, 115th Cong. (2018). Even if this law passes, it will solve only the 
vertical conflict between the states and the federal government, not the horizontal conflict 
among states with widely divergent marijuana tolerances. 
10  State Marijuana Laws in 2018 Map, GOVERNING, http://www.governing.com/gov-data/sta 
te-marijuana-laws-map-medical-recreational.html [https://perma.cc/Z6SM-BBQZ] (last upda 
ted Mar. 30, 2018). 
11  Erwin Chemerinsky et al., Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana Regulation, 62 UCLA 
L. REV. 74, 77 (2015). 
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the conflict between legalizing states and the federal government (the vertical 
aspect) and the conflict among the states (the horizontal aspect).12 
The horizontal aspect emanates from the fact that legalizing states cannot 
fully stop the transboundary wafting—the contact high that a neighboring state 
unintentionally receives. For example, residents of non-legalizing states may 
purchase marijuana in legalizing states and bring it home (either in their suit-
cases or in their bodies, while the metabolites are still active).13 This spillover 
places burdens on the non-legalizing state. Statistics reflect an increase in mari-
juana use and possession in non-legalizing states that border legalizing ones14 
and a resulting increase in the numbers of drug arrests,15 car accidents,16 and 
volume of drugs seized.17 In addition, citizens of the non-legalizing states are 
experiencing long-term health consequences18 and lost productivity.19 It is high 
time that non-legalizing states fight back in these weed wars. 
                                                        
12  Brannon P. Denning, State Legalization of Marijuana as a “Diagonal Federalism” Prob-
lem, 11 FIU L. REV. 349, 349 (2016). 
13  See Rachael Rettner, Riding High: Pot-Smoking Drivers Evade Blood Tests, LIVE SCI. 
(Feb. 3, 2016, 12:07 PM), http://www.livescience.com/53578-marijuana-driving-thc-blood-t 
est.html [https://perma.cc/5ZXD-GL8D] (noting that active metabolites break down quickly, 
from 8.2 micrograms per liter—an amount associated with impairment—to less than 5 mi-
crograms per liter within two hours). 
14  See David Hendee, Nebraska on its Own with Drug Enforcement Costs Tied to Colorado 
Pot Sales, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD (Apr. 20, 2014), https://www.omaha.com/news/nebraska 
-on-its-own-with-drug-enforcement-costs-tied-to/article_d76f74a4-b109-5080-9d7b-4e2626 
4686bc.html [https://perma.cc/3Q4F-DZ7D] (stating that Colorado marijuana can be found 
throughout the United States); Denver7, Colorado Weed Blamed for Increasing Law En-
forcement Costs in Nebraska, YOUTUBE (May 25, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v 
=y0JocQFv2IE [https://perma.cc/C7PW-GYVB] (explaining that Colorado marijuana has 
required a Nebraska town to raise its jail budget more than $100,000); see also ROCKY 
MOUNTAIN HIDTA, THE LEGALIZATION OF MARIJUANA IN COLORADO: THE IMPACT 38 (2013) 
(noting a 407 [percent] increase in Colorado “marijuana interdiction seizures destined for 
other states”). 
15  See Jenny Deam, Colorado’s Neighbors Dismayed by New Wave of Marijuana Traffic, 
L.A. TIMES (May 27, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-pot-trafficking-
20140527-story.html [https://perma.cc/PL7S-MTFZ] (describing increases in marijuana-
related arrests and charges in Nebraska); Trevor Hughes, Sheriffs Sue Colorado Over Legal 
Marijuana, USA TODAY (Mar. 5, 2015, 12:08 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/20 
15/03/05/sheriffs-from-three-states-sue-colorado-over-marijuana/24385401/ [https://perma.c 
c/66S2-3LE2] (“Felony drug arrests in the town of Chappell in Deuel County, Neb., 7 miles 
north of the Colorado border, jumped 400 [percent] over three years . . . . Police officers 
monitoring the flow of marijuana outside Colorado say volumes have risen annually.”). 
16  See John Faubion, Reevaluating Drug Policy: Uruguay’s Efforts to Reform Marijuana 
Laws, 19 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 383, 402 (2013) (“Perhaps most importantly, the short-term 
motor function impairment accompanying ‘acute intoxication’ results in difficulty operating 
motor vehicles, presenting the greatest health and safety risk.”); id. at 406 (noting a potential 
for “increase in the amount of traffic accidents resulting from driving under the influence”). 
17  See ROCKY MOUNTAIN HIDTA, supra note 14, at 38 (407 percent increase in marijuana 
seizures destined for other states). 
18  Faubion, supra note 16, at 406 (noting “loss in IQ points over time,” “acute short-term 
memory loss, slowed reaction time and impaired motor coordination, altered judgment and 
decision-making, and increased heart rate” and citing studies regarding “lower life satisfac-
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In a previous Article, Reefer Madness: How Non-Legalizing States Can 
Revamp Dram Shop Laws to Protect Themselves from Marijuana Spillover 
from Their Legalizing Neighbors, I proposed that at least part of the battle plan 
should include the enactment of statutory liability against the out-of-state mari-
juana dispensaries.20 These statutes, modeled on Dram Shop Acts, would im-
pose civil liability on marijuana sellers when their sales to citizens from a non-
legalizing state cause harm to the non-legalizing state. That Article explored the 
utility of such laws in terms of decreasing the flow of marijuana into non-
legalizing states by forcing dispensaries to internalize the externalities they cre-
ate.21 This Article will explore the likelihood and constitutionality of the extra-
territorial application of such laws. 
This Article will proceed in four principal parts. Part I will review the hy-
pothetical Gram Shop Act, will pose a hypothetical that will be used to explore 
the utility and constitutionality of such an Act, and will briefly reiterate why a 
non-legalizing state might wish to adopt such an Act. The next three parts will 
tackle the primary doctrinal arguments against Gram Shop liability: personal 
jurisdiction problems, choice-of-law uncertainty, and constitutionality con-
cerns. Part II will consider whether non-legalizing states may assert jurisdiction 
over out-of-state dispensaries when they sell to Home State citizens who, in 
turn, cause harm in the Home State. Part III will explore the extraterritorial ap-
plication of gram shop liability under generally accepted choice-of-law princi-
ples. Part IV will more closely address potential constitutional problems asso-
ciated with the extraterritorial application of the Gram Shop Act under the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause, Due Process Clause, and the dormant Commerce 
Clause. The Article concludes that non-legalizing states will benefit from Gram 
Shop legislation and that such legislation comports with constitutional norms. 
I. DRAM SHOP LAWS AND GRAM SHOP LAWS 
Most US states have dram shop laws22 that impose liability on restaurants, 
bars, and liquor stores when they sell alcohol to minors or already intoxicated 
                                                                                                                                
tion, poorer mental and physical health, relationship problems, and less academic and career 
success,” in addition to “higher risk of heart attack,” “respiratory illnesses, hallucinations, 
and paranoia”). 
19  Id. at 407 (comparing income from alcohol and tobacco taxes to its costs in terms of 
health care, criminal justice, and lost productivity). 
20  Jessica Berch, Reefer Madness: How Non-Legalizing States Can Revamp Dram Shop 
Laws to Protect Themselves from Marijuana Spillover from Their Legalizing Neighbors, 58 
B.C. L. REV. 863, 863 (2017). 
21  Id. at 880. 
22  The National Conference of State Legislatures catalogues that thirty states have dram 
shop statutes. See Dram Shop Civil Liability and Criminal Penalty State Statutes, NAT’L 
CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/dram-sh 
op-liability-state-statutes.aspx [https://perma.cc/C7NQ-JBPR] (last updated June 14, 2013). 
Additional jurisdictions have dram shop liability by court decision. See Thomson Reuters, 
Dram Shop Statutes, 0110 SURVEYS 65 (Dec. 2017) (finding the following U.S. jurisdictions 
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individuals who then cause injuries because of their intoxication. Dram shop 
liability enables the third-party victims of intoxicated tortfeasors to sue the es-
tablishment that furnished the alcohol, instead of or in addition to the intoxicat-
ed individual who directly caused the harm.23 Evidence shows that dram shop 
laws have been successful in deterring the sale of alcohol to minors and overly 
intoxicated patrons.24 
Given the deterrent value of dram shop liability on alcohol sales, it stands 
to reason that gram shop liability would deter marijuana sales. A model Gram 
Shop Act, originally set forth in Reefer Madness,25 is reproduced below. For 
ease of discussion throughout this Article, the Act is written for a non-
legalizing state (Nebraska) that borders a legalizing state (Colorado). 
A. Model Gram Shop Act 
The Gram Shop Act could provide as follows: 
A. A person who furnishes marijuana to a resident of Nebraska may be liable in 
damages to an injured third party if the Nebraskan to whom the marijuana is 
furnished consumes the marijuana and, while under the influence thereof, causes 
personal injury in Nebraska or to any resident of Nebraska.26 
B. Definitions. For purposes of this section the following definitions apply: 
1. “Person” means any individual or company or business or any employee 
thereof, except any federally permitted researchers or facilities running a drug 
trial approved by the Food and Drug Administration under the Controlled Sub-
stances Act.27 
                                                                                                                                
do not have dram shop liability: Kansas, Maryland, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Virginia, 
Washington, West Virginia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands). 
23  Of course, the victim may sue the drunkard instead of the bar, or in addition to it, using 
normal tort principles. Dram shop liability casts a wider net to include the seller, as well as 
the drinker. Most dram shop statutes impose liability on those who furnish the alcohol to the 
drinker; they use terms like “selling,” “giving” or “otherwise disposing” to cast a wide net, 
which may include liquor stores in addition to restaurants and bars. E.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-
71 (2018). For a full list of states with dram shop acts, see Dram Shop Civil Liability and 
Criminal Penalty State Statutes, supra note 22. 
24  Julia A. Harden, Comments, Dramshop Liability: Should the Intoxicated Person Recover 
for His Own Injuries?, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 227, 232 (1987) (discussing Ohio’s dram shop law 
and stating that “the statute certainly intends to protect the public”); Frank A. Sloan et al., 
Liability, Risk Perceptions, and Precautions at Bars, 43 J.L. & ECON. 473, 499 (2000) 
(“[T]here is a strong rationale for relying on tort law as a method for controlling excessive 
alcohol use.”); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Making Liquor Immunity Worse: Nevada’s Undue Pro-
tection of Commercial Hosts Evicting Vulnerable and Dangerous Patrons, 14 NEV. L.J. 866, 
874 (2014) (“The weight of scholarly research clearly suggests that dram shop laws are ef-
fective in reducing alcohol-related driving injuries.”). 
25  Berch, supra note 20, at 886–87. 
26  Id. The statute has been drafted narrowly, so that a dispensary must furnish marijuana to a 
Nebraskan to trigger liability. As explained in Part IV, below, this is necessary to provide 
notice to the dispensary in order to avoid any Due Process concerns. 
27  Regulations permit certain clinical trials on cannabidiol, an extract from the marijuana 
plant. See 21 C.F.R. § 1301.18 (2018) (discussing research protocols for a Schedule I con-
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2. “Furnish” means to sell, exchange, barter, deliver, give, make available, or 
provide in any manner. 
3. “Marijuana” includes any consumable product containing Tetrahydrocan-
nabinol (THC), the principal psychoactive constituent of cannabis. 
4. “Resident” means someone who has an in-state address at which he or she 
presently resides. 
5. “While under the influence” means the person is affected to the slightest 
degree. 
6. “Damages” include compensatory damages, pain and suffering, and puni-
tive damages. 
B. Hypothetical 
Let us set up the litigation and constitutionality issues with a fairly routine 
hypothetical. Assume that Mary Jane, a Nebraskan, drives to Colorado, a trail-
blazer in the recreational marijuana experiment.28 Mary Jane visits Colorado in 
part because the state has legalized marijuana, although she has other reasons 
for visiting as well. 
Toward the end of Mary Jane’s trip (which turns out to be metaphorical in 
addition to actual), she visits a dispensary just on the Colorado side of the Ne-
braska/Colorado border. As the dispensary employees must do, they ask for her 
identification as she enters the store. She displays her Nebraska driver’s li-
cense, which establishes that she is of legal age to purchase marijuana.29 After 
purchasing a legal quantity of marijuana,30 she returns to her hotel and con-
sumes the drug,31 unaware that modern marijuana delivers considerably more 
THC than the substance she vaguely remembers from her college years.32 After 
                                                                                                                                
trolled substance); see also DEA Eases Requirements for FDA-Approved Clinical Trials on 
Cannabidiol, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION (Dec. 23, 2015), https://www.dea.gov/d 
ivisions/hq/2015/hq122315.shtml [https://perma.cc/5KLW-RKXJ]. 
28  Colorado legalized recreational marijuana in November 2012. See COLO. CONST. art. 
XVIII, § 16. 
29  Evan Bush & Bob Young, Everything You Want to Know About Legal Pot in Washington, 
SEATTLE TIMES (June 30, 2014, 3:40 PM), http://blogs.seattletimes.com/pot/2014/06/30/ever 
ything-you-want-to-know-about-legal-pot-in-washington/ [https://perma.cc/VV5A-XRGL] 
(“If you want to purchase legal pot, you had better bring valid identification with you to the 
store.”). If Mary Jane had shown her passport, the rest of the hypothetical might not work. A 
passport does not reflect current domicile, so the employees would not know that Mary Jane 
is a Nebraskan and so would not be aware that they had sold marijuana to an out-of-state cit-
izen who lives in a non-legalizing state. Presumably, it is a rare instance in which a U.S. citi-
zen would use her passport as her identification at a U.S. store. 
30  Colorado permits adults to purchase up to one ounce of pot. COLO. REV. STAT. § 44-12-
402(3)(a)(I) (2018) (“A retail marijuana store may not sell more than one ounce of retail ma-
rijuana . . . during a single transaction to a person.”). 
31  Mary Jane may not smoke in public. See Faubion, supra note 16, at 390 (“As in Colorado, 
it remains illegal [in Washington] to smoke the drug in public places . . . .”). 
32  Marijuana Far More Potent than it Used to Be, Tests Find, CBS NEWS (Mar. 23, 2015, 
9:40 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/marijuana-far-more-potent-than-it-used-to-be-test 
s-find/ [https://perma.cc/3EXF-927Y] (“[T]he average potency of marijuana has probably 
increased by a factor of at least three.”); see also Faubion, supra note 16, at 387 (“In recent 
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finishing her joint and polishing it off with a marijuana-infused brownie, she 
checks out of her hotel, hops in her car, and drives home to Nebraska. 
Shortly after crossing into Nebraska, Mary Jane causes a car accident. The 
other driver sustains serious injuries and must remain in a Nebraska hospital for 
several days.33 Mary Jane carries the minimum amount of state-required auto 
insurance and is largely judgment-proof. 
The other driver hires a lawyer, who sues Mary Jane in Nebraska state 
court. During discovery, the victim learns that Mary Jane had driven to Colora-
do intending to purchase and consume marijuana. That gives the victim’s attor-
ney a “dope idea.” He turns his attention to the marijuana dispensary, which 
has substantially more assets than Mary Jane does, and which may be liable 
under Nebraska’s newly enacted (hypothetical) Gram Shop Act. 
The injured victim timely amends his suit against Mary Jane to include a 
claim against the dispensary based on the Nebraska Gram Shop Act. The Ne-
braska court immediately faces three thorny issues in this revised lawsuit.34 
First, is it constitutionally permissible to assert personal jurisdiction against the 
out-of-state defendant?35 Second, As a matter of choice of law, may the Ne-
braska court apply the Nebraska Gram Shop Act against the Colorado defend-
ant?36 Third, if the court may do so under choice-of-law principles, would such 
a choice comport with the constitution?37 The stakes for the injured victim 
could not be any higher: his medical bills substantially overwhelm Mary Jane’s 
minimal insurance coverage. The next three Parts of the Article will consider 
these three issues. 
II. PERSONAL JURISDICTION CHALLENGES 
Personal jurisdiction addresses a court’s ability to exercise power over the 
parties in a case. As a quick reminder, for a court to be able to assert such pow-
er over an out-of-state defendant, the defendant must have “certain minimum 
contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 
‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ”38 There are two types 
                                                                                                                                
years, the toleration policy [of Amsterdam] has been called into question as the tetrahydro-
cannabinol (THC) element of cannabis—the primary psychoactive component—has in-
creased dramatically.”); id. at 406 (“[I]n 1970, the THC content of an average marijuana 
plant was one and a half percent; today, the THC content varies from 8 to 20 percent.”). 
33  This injured victim may be a Nebraskan, though he need not be. As explored further, par-
ticularly in Section IV.A (regarding the Full Faith and Credit Clause), the victim’s status as a 
Nebraska domiciliary increases Nebraska’s interest in applying its law to the litigation, 
though such status is not necessary for the application of Nebraska’s law to be constitutional. 
34  See generally Berch, supra note 20, at 889–91 (providing a brief overview to these is-
sues). 
35  See personal jurisdiction discussion infra Part II. 
36  See conflict of laws discussion infra Part III. 
37  See constitutional discussion infra Part IV. 
38  Int’l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 
457, 463 (1940)). 
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of personal jurisdiction, general and specific.39 A court has general jurisdiction 
over a corporate defendant when it is “essentially at home”40 in the forum be-
cause its in-state activity is “continuous and systematic.”41 A court has specific 
jurisdiction even if the defendant has committed only “single or isolated” acts 
in the forum as long as the suit arises out of those acts.42 In addition, the asser-
tion of jurisdiction must be fair, taking into consideration “the burden on the 
defendant, the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiff’s 
interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, the interstate judicial sys-
tem’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies, and 
the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive 
social policies.”43 
If the injured victim chooses to sue the dispensary in Nebraska (which he 
ought to do for his own convenience and for the stronger likelihood that Ne-
braska’s Gram Shop Act will apply),44 he has a strong case for specific jurisdic-
tion over the out-of-state dispensary. Given the many purposeful contacts be-
tween the defendant and the state of Nebraska described below, the Nebraska 
court will likely conclude that the defendant has “purposefully derive[d] bene-
fit” from its contacts with Nebraska.45 
Of paramount importance, the out-of-state dispensary knowingly sold ma-
rijuana to, and therefore earned profit from, Mary Jane, whom the employees 
knew to be from Nebraska. The dispensary employees would have been aware 
of Mary Jane’s state citizenship because Colorado law requires purchasers of 
                                                        
39  Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 n.15 (1985) (“ ‘Specific’ jurisdiction 
contrasts with ‘general’ jurisdiction, pursuant to which ‘a State exercises personal jurisdic-
tion over a defendant in a suit not arising out of or related to the defendant’s contacts with 
the forum.’ ”) (citation omitted). 
40  Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011). 
41  Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317. 
42  Id. 
43  Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). On 
June 19, 2017, the Supreme Court may have unsettled this two-part framework. In Bristol-
Myers Squibb v. Superior Court of California, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017), the Court seem-
ingly returns to a territorial justification for jurisdiction after endorsing a fairness under-
standing for the last several decades. See, e.g., Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie 
des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982) (Personal jurisdiction “represents a re-
striction on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liber-
ty.”). After some hand-waiving at the fairness implications of personal jurisdiction, the Court 
clearly articulates the territorial notion: “As we have put it, restrictions on personal jurisdic-
tion are more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are 
a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States.” Bristol-Myers 
Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1780 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
44  For a further discussion of choice-of-law principles, see infra Part III. For now, it suffices 
to say that many courts exhibit a distinct forum-law preference: “When the court has juris-
diction of the parties its primary responsibility is to follow its own substantive law. The basic 
law is the law of the forum, which should not be displaced without valid reasons.” Foster v. 
Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827, 829 (Ky. 1972). 
45  Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473 (citation omitted). 
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marijuana to show identification.46 The sale to Mary Jane likely is not the dis-
pensary’s only sale to a Nebraskan; the location of the dispensary near the Ne-
braska/Colorado border belies any suggestion that the dispensary owner did not 
intend to sell to Nebraskans. Moreover, the dispensary may have placed adver-
tisements in newspapers and magazines (online or paper versions) that circulat-
ed in the area and may have found their way into Nebraska either virtually 
(when an out-of-state citizen viewed the advertisement) or actually (when the 
advertisement was physically carried into the neighboring jurisdiction). Other 
contacts may be imagined, such as a billboard placed on the Colorado side of 
the border but visible from Nebraska, touting “Nearest Marijuana Dispensary 2 
Miles Ahead,” or a listing in a directory that circulated in the cross-border area. 
Given that level of purposeful contacts with the forum state, it is unlikely that 
the Nebraska court would decline to find jurisdiction over the dispensary.47 
In terms of fairness (should such a restriction still carry independent 
weight), requiring the Colorado dispensary to defend in Nebraska should not 
pose an unreasonable hardship.48 Given the dispensary’s location just over the 
border from Nebraska and the ease of modern travel, the Nebraska court should 
find the exercise of jurisdiction fair.49 The plaintiff’s extensive injuries render it 
difficult for him to pursue his case in Colorado.50 And Nebraska, too, has an 
interest in adjudicating the suit in the forum, as the accident has placed a bur-
den on its law enforcement and medical personnel.51 
In sum, the dispensary has more than minimal contacts with neighboring 
Nebraska, and fairness considerations do not appear to provide strong basis 
                                                        
46  COLO. REV. STAT. § 44-11-402(5) (2018) (requiring medical identification card to pur-
chase medical marijuana); COLO. REV. STAT. § 44-12-402(3)(b)(I) (2018) (“Prior to initiating 
a sale, the employee of the retail marijuana store making the sale shall verify that the pur-
chaser has a valid identification card showing the purchaser is twenty-one years of age or 
older.”). 
47  See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1781 (requiring “affiliation between the fo-
rum and the underlying controversy, principally, [an] activity or an occurrence that takes 
place in the forum State”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). This suggests the dispensary’s purposeful contacts with Nebraska (by advertising, 
for example) are sufficient contacts; and the fact that this particular victim was injured in 
Nebraska helps further the relationship between the forum and the claim. 
48  Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477 (“[W]here a defendant who purposefully has directed his 
activities at forum residents seeks to defeat jurisdiction, he must present a compelling case 
that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable.”). 
49  Id. at 474 (“And because modern transportation and communications have made it much 
less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in economic 
activity, it usually will not be unfair to subject him to the burdens of litigating in another fo-
rum for disputes relating to such activity.”) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). 
50  Id. at 476–77 (listing the fairness factors and noting “where a defendant who purposefully 
has directed his activities at forum residents seeks to defeat jurisdiction, he must present a 
compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction 
unreasonable”). 
51  Id. 
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against jurisdiction. Thus, a relatively strong case for personal jurisdiction over 
the out-of-state dispensary can be made. 
III. CONFLICT-OF-LAWS CHALLENGES 
Assuming that the Nebraska court agrees with the analysis in the previous 
Part and accepts personal jurisdiction over the Colorado dispensary, the next 
hurdle for the injured victim is to convince the court to apply its in-state Gram 
Shop Act against the out-of-state dispensary. This Part will take up that charge, 
principally by comparing gram shop liability to dram shop liability, which has 
been applied extraterritorially. 
A. Dram Shop Cases 
A state clearly may apply its own law to a case that has connections solely 
with that state. For example, the California legislature has adopted dram shop 
liability.52 Because that State also permits the sale of alcoholic beverages, a 
person may overindulge at a California bar, leave the bar, and negligently harm 
another individual in California. The injured person may sue the bar in Califor-
nia and invoke California’s Act to recover for injuries incurred. That entirely 
in-state application of dram shop liability poses no (interesting) conflict-of-
laws controversy.53 
But not all torts are entirely intrastate. The overindulging California driver 
may have decided against drinking in California, instead slipping over into Ne-
vada to gamble and drink at a casino on the California/Nevada border. Alt-
hough he consumed alcohol solely in Nevada, upon leaving the casino, he 
might return to his Home State of California and injure an innocent victim in 
California. This injured person may sue the casino in California and invoke 
California’s Act to recover for his injuries. It is this extraterritorial application 
of dram shop liability that poses the conflict-of-laws issue.54 
When faced with this issue in the dram shop context, some courts have ap-
plied dram shop liability against the extraterritorial defendant; that is, a court in 
a state with a dram shop liability sometimes has applied that in-state law 
against a liquor establishment in a neighboring state, regardless of whether that 
neighboring state has such a law. This is what happened in the famous conflict-
of-laws case Bernhard v. Harrah’s Club.55 There, in response to advertisements 
by Harrah’s Club, two California residents drove from California to Harrah’s 
                                                        
52  CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25602 (West 2018). 
53  Of course, the business may have a defense or otherwise escape liability. But the potential 
for liability against the in-state business is apparent. 
54  See generally Donald M. Zupanec, Annotation, Choice of Law as to Liability of Liquor 
Seller for Injuries Caused by Intoxicated Person, 2 A.L.R. 4th 952 (1980) (collecting cases 
regarding the extraterritorial effect of dram shops). 
55  Bernhard v. Harrah’s Club, 546 P.2d 719, 725 (Cal. 1976), superseded by statute, CAL. 
CIV. CODE § 1714 (West 2018). 
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Club, “[a] gambling and drinking club” just across the border in Nevada.56 
They drank to “a point of obvious intoxication rendering them incapable of 
safely driving a car.”57 They then drove back to California, where they caused a 
car accident with another California resident, Richard A. Bernhard.58 Mr. Bern-
hard sued Harrah’s Club, invoking California’s common-law dram shop liabil-
ity.59 Mr. Bernhard had to rely on California’s law because Nevada law denied 
dram shop liability.60 
When the case made its way to the California Supreme Court, the justices 
noted that the case posed a classic conflicts problem because the two interested 
states had divergent liability laws: “(1) California—the place of plaintiff’s resi-
dence and domicile, the place where he was injured, and the forum; and (2) 
Nevada—the place of defendant’s residence and the place of the wrong.”61 The 
California Supreme Court endeavored to determine which state had a stronger 
interest in having its law applied.62 Nevada had a “definite interest . . . to pro-
tect its resident tavern keepers,”63 while California also had an interest in “pro-
tecting members of the general public from injuries to person and damage to 
property resulting from the excessive use of intoxicating liquor.”64 California’s 
interest, however, was “special” or paramount in the instant case because the 
plaintiff happened to be a California resident injured in California.65 After cata-
loguing the various interests of the states, the court thought it “clear that each 
state ha[d] an interest in the application of its respective law of liability and 
nonliability,” and that those interests conflicted with each other.66 In other 
words, this case presented a true conflict between the laws and policies of the 
two affected states.67 
The California Supreme Court then proceeded “to determine which state’s 
interest would be more impaired if its policy were subordinated to the policy of 
the other state.”68 The court noted that the defendant had “put itself at the heart 
of California’s regulatory interest[s]” by “advertis[ing] for and otherwise solic-
it[ing] in California the business of California residents” and, further, the de-
                                                        
56  Id. at 720. 
57  Id. 
58  Id. 
59  Id. at 722. 
60  Id. Nevada denied liability for obvious reasons—its interest in its casinos, which cannot 
thrive without liquor sales. 
61  Id. at 721. 
62  Id. 
63  Id. 
64  Id. at 722. 
65  Id. 
66  Id. 
67  True conflicts arise when both states have an interest in applying their laws. See generally 
Brainerd Currie, Married Women’s Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 227, 238 (1958) (propounding the governmental interest analysis). 
68  Bernhard, 546 P.2d at 723. 
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fendant knew that these Californians “in response to said advertising and solici-
tation, [would] use the public highways of the State of California in going and 
coming from” Harrah’s Club.69 The court further found a shared policy interest 
between Nevada and California: Nevada, although it refused to impose civil li-
ability on resident taverns, prohibited the selling of alcohol to already intoxi-
cated persons through its criminal law.70 The court therefore upheld the extra-
territorial application of California’s common-law liability against the Nevada 
bar.71 
Although Bernhard presents the most famous example of extraterritorial 
application of dram shop liability, the case is by no means the only one.72 Other 
courts have applied dram shop liability against out-of-state bars when the acci-
dent happened in the Home State, particularly where the injured plaintiff was 
also a Home State citizen.73 
In Zygmuntowicz v. Hospitality Investments, Inc., for example, a group of 
friends drove from their Pennsylvania homes to a New Jersey nightclub be-
cause of advertisements and promotions offered by that establishment.74 Mi-
chael Zygmuntowicz drank four beers, four shots of unknown liquor, six to 
seven mixed vodka drinks, and one or two additional alcoholic beverages.75 On 
                                                        
69  Id. at 725. 
70  Id. 
71  Id. at 725–26. 
72  In Meyers v. Kallestead, No. 91 C 20362, 1992 WL 280450, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 
1992), the Northern District of Illinois applied the in-state dram shop law against an out-of-
state business. In that case, James Hall drove his truck from Iowa to Savanna, Illinois, where 
he drank several alcoholic beverages at the defendant’s business. Id. at *1. On his drive 
home, while in Iowa, he caused a car accident that killed one person and injured another, and 
the victims and their families filed suit against the bar in an Illinois court. Id. Interestingly, 
despite the fact that the Iowa state courts held that there was no personal jurisdiction over the 
defendants, id., using choice-of-law analysis, the Illinois District Court found that Iowa had 
the most significant contacts with the dispute, id. at *6, because it was “the place of the inju-
ry” and the domicile of the plaintiffs, id. at *4, and despite the fact that defendant did not 
advertise in Iowa, id. at *1. 
73  Waynick v. Chicago’s Last Dep’t Store, 269 F.2d 322, 326 (7th Cir. 1959); Zygmun-
towicz v. Hospitality Invs., Inc., 828 F. Supp. 346, 349 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Sommers v. 13300 
Brandon Corp., 712 F. Supp. 702, 706 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Bankord v. DeRock, 423 F. Supp. 
602, 602, 606 (N.D. Iowa 1976); Hoeller v. Riverside Resort Hotel, 820 P.2d 316, 316, 322 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1991); Bernhard, 546 P.2d at 725–26; Meyers, 1992 WL 280450, at *6; Ru-
bitsky v. Russo’s Derby, Inc., 216 N.E.2d 680, 680, 682 (Ill. App. Ct. 1966); Colligan v 
Cousar, 187 N.E.2d 292, 302 (Ill. App. Ct. 1963); Butler v. Wittland, 153 N.E.2d 106, 110 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1958); Shaw v. LDC Enters., 863 N.E.2d 424, 433 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (af-
firming the application of Indiana nuisance law against an Illinois bar alleged to have served 
underage Indiana citizens); Blamey v. Brown, 270 N.W.2d 884, 890–91 (Minn. 1978), abro-
gated on other grounds by W. Am. Ins. Co. v. Westin, Inc. 337 N.W.2d 676 (Minn. 1983); 
Carver v. Schafer, 647 S.W.2d 570, 578 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983), superseded by statute as stat-
ed in Andres v. Alpha Kappa Lambda Fraternity, 730 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. 1987). 
74  Zygmuntowicz, 828 F. Supp. at 348. 
75  Id. 
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the drive home, he crashed his car and died.76 His parents sued the nightclub, 
invoking Pennsylvania’s dram shop law.77 The District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania reviewed the “policies and governmental interests un-
derlying the competing laws” of New Jersey (the location of the nightclub) and 
Pennsylvania (the domicile of the decedent).78 In part because the nightclub had 
specifically targeted the Pennsylvania market, the court determined that Penn-
sylvania’s dram shop law governed the action.79 
In yet another case, Meyers v. Kallestead, a district court permitted extra-
territorial application of dram shop liability simply because that state was the 
place of the injury and the domicile of the plaintiffs, despite the fact that the 
out-of-state defendant did not advertise in that state.80 This opinion purports to 
follow the mainstream in modern choice of law analysis—the Restatement 
(Second) of Conflicts—which sets forth a presumption that the state with the 
most significant relationship to a tort is the state where the accident occurred.81 
Contrary cases do exist, refusing to apply the law of the state where the in-
jury occurred against the out-of-state seller.82 These cases tend to employ the 
same methodology as the ones that do apply dram shop liability extraterritorial-
ly. They, too, examine the states’ interests and try to determine the center of 
gravity. In these cases, however, the courts come to the opposite conclusion, 
finding that the bar’s residence presents the weightier connection to the suit.83 
                                                        
76  Id. at 349. 
77  Id. at 348. 
78  Id. at 349. 
79  Id. (“We find that after comparing the competing dram shop laws, Pennsylvania’s law 
favors finding liability and is better able to achieve both states’ policies and interests. Addi-
tionally, the Defendant specifically targeted the Pennsylvania market and should, therefore, 
have expected and planned for possible suits under Pennsylvania law. Therefore, we must 
conclude that Pennsylvania’s law governs in this case.”). 
80  Meyers v. Kallestead, No. 91 C 20362, 1992 WL 280450, at *3–4, 6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 
1992). 
81  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 146 (AM. LAW INST.1971) (“In an action 
for a personal injury, the local law of the state where the injury occurred determines the 
rights and liabilities of the parties, unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other 
state has a more significant relationship under the principles stated in § 6 to the occurrence 
and the parties, in which event the local law of the other state will be applied.”). 
82  See, e.g., Wimmer v. Koenigseder, 484 N.E.2d 1088, 1092 (Ill. 1985); Liff v. 
Haezbroeck, 200 N.E.2d 525, 527 (Ill. App. Ct. 1964); Dunaway v. Fellous, 842 S.W.2d 
166, 168 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992). 
83  In Dunaway v. Fellous, for example, Illinois resident Rudy Sample “consumed some in-
toxicating beverages” and “became intoxicated” at a restaurant in Missouri. Dunaway, 842 
S.W.2d at 167. After leaving, he drove into Illinois, where he crashed into another car. Id. at 
167–68. The driver and passenger of that other car sued the restaurant in a Missouri court, 
alleging violations of the Illinois dram shop law. Id. at 168. The Missouri court of appeals, 
applying the “most significant relationship” test of the Second Restatement, ultimately de-
termined that Missouri, not Illinois, had the stronger relationship to the suit. Id. at 168–69. 
At first, the court said that the two states had equal interests in the dispute: “where the injury 
occurred, in Illinois, balances equally against the place where the alleged conduct giving rise 
to the accident or the drinking occurred, in Missouri,” id. at 168, and “the domicile or resi-
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Sometimes, too, these courts determine that the state legislature did not wish 
the law to apply outside the state’s borders.84 
Reasonable minds may differ on whether the cases permitting extraterrito-
rial application are better supported than those that do not, which factors should 
weigh more heavily in the conflicts analysis, and how exactly a court should go 
about breaking a tie in the event of a true conflict.85 But reasonable minds can-
not disagree that some courts have permitted the extraterritorial application of 
dram shop liability against out-of-state liquor establishments, particularly when 
the injured victim is a Home State citizen, the out-of-state establishment adver-
tises in-state, and the Home State legislature has not signaled a desire that the 
law apply only to intrastate disputes.86 
If dram shop liability may be imposed extraterritorially, it stands to reason 
that gram shop liability may as well, unless there are material differences be-
tween the two forms of liability that make the analogy inapposite. These poten-
tially distinguishing factors will be explored in the next Part.87 
                                                                                                                                
dence of appellants, in Illinois, counterbalances the location of [the] business of respondents, 
in Missouri.” Id. However, Missouri, as the forum, “has a real interest in ensuring that the 
laws applied in its courts do not contravene its public policies.” Id. at 169. And, therefore, 
the Missouri court applied its own law. This analysis reaffirms why the injured plaintiff in 
the Mary Jane hypothetical should sue in Nebraska; that is, the Home State is more likely to 
apply its own law to the dispute (just like the Missouri court applied Missouri law in Duna-
way). 
84  Graham v. Gen. U.S. Grant Post No. 2665, V.F.W., 248 N.E.2d 657, 660 (Ill. 1969) (“A 
relevant fact is that the legislature has not seen fit to amend the Dram Shop Act so as to give 
it extraterritorial applicability.”). 
85  One case notes that “[t]he modern trend has also been toward choosing the law that would 
impose liability.” Sommers v. 13300 Brandon Corp., 712 F. Supp. 702, 706 (N.D. Ill. 1989). 
86  Additionally, in Sommers, the court was influenced by the fact that the tavern was near 
the border, so application of the neighboring state’s law should not be “unexpected or unpre-
dictable.” Id. 
87  To the extent that the dram shop laws in these cases may be read broadly to cover the sale 
of other “intoxicating” items, such as marijuana, those states hardly seem to have standing to 
complain if Nebraska applies its Gram Shop Act extraterritorially. For example, Colorado’s 
Dram Shop Act prohibits the sale of liquor to already intoxicated persons. COLO. REV. STAT. 
§ 44-3-801 (2018). Even though Colorado has textually limited dram shop liability to pur-
veyors of “alcohol beverages,” the existence of the law indicates a policy to hold the sellers 
of intoxicating products liable for injuries resulting from the consumption of the products. 
That is the same policy animating Nebraska’s hypothetical Gram Shop Act. Thus, if any-
thing, application of Nebraska’s law “effectuates, rather than frustrates, the policies of both 
states.” Pardey v. Boulevard Billiard Club, 518 A.2d 1349, 1352 (R.I. 1986). In classic con-
flicts terms, this may be the case of a false conflict. Currie, supra note 67, at 253–54. In 
plainer terms yet, there simply is no conflict between the states’ policies, and therefore no 
reason not to apply the shared policy of liability. To the extent that a state has dram shop lia-
bility at all (even one that does not textually cover marijuana), that state’s policy should not 
be offended by application of Nebraska’s more specific Gram Shop Act. Thus, while it is 
plausible that Nebraska would apply its Gram Shop Act against an out-of-state seller, it is 
also within the realm of possibility that Colorado would apply Nebraska’s law as well. 
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B. Dram Shop Liability Versus Gram Shop Liability 
Three facts may distinguish dram shop liability from the proposed Gram 
Shop liability. First, some states’ dram shop liability is judge-made, not statuto-
ry, while the hypothetical Gram Shop Act comes in the form of a statute.88 Sec-
ond, dram shop liability primarily applies in-state with some out-of-state ap-
plicability, while a Gram Shop Act passed by a prohibiting state would apply to 
few (if any) in-state defendants, but instead will apply almost entirely to out-of-
state sales by out-of-state dispensaries—that is, it will primarily apply to out-
of-state activities and actors who cause effects in the enacting state. Third, 
dram shop liability paradigmatically applies against bars and restaurants when 
they sell liquor to patrons who become overly intoxicated on the premises, and 
thus is based on a theory that the servers at the bars and restaurants can see 
their patrons’ intoxication and, presumably, can cease to serve such patrons to 
avoid over-intoxication. The Gram Shop Act, on the other hand, would apply to 
dispensaries even though the individuals became intoxicated off-site so there 
would be no opportunity for a dispensary employee to monitor the level of in-
gestion or impairment.89 Despite these differences between dram shop liability 
and the hypothetical gram shop liability, courts should apply gram shop liabil-
ity extraterritorially—at least those courts that apply dram shop liability out-of-
state. 
The first distinguishing fact—that some dram shop liability is common-
law—makes little difference for purposes of extraterritorial application. 
Whether created by the courts as common-law or enacted by a legislature as 
statutory law, the law is the law. Courts have applied extraterritorially both 
common-law dram shop liability, like that at issue in Bernhardt,90 and statutory 
dram shop liability, like the law at issue in Zygmuntowicz.91 Thus, the fact that 
gram shop liability would be a creature purely of statute should not inhibit the 
potential extraterritorial application of gram shop liability in the conflict-of-
laws analysis. 
In fact, the argument for applying statutory law extraterritorially is perhaps 
even stronger than that for applying judge-made law outside the state because 
                                                        
88  Bernhard v. Harrah’s Club, 546 P.2d 719, 720 (Cal. 1976), superseded by statute, CAL. 
CIV. CODE § 1714 (West 2018) (noting liability arose under the decision in Vesely v. Sager, 
486 P.2d 151 (Cal. 1971)). 
89  See COLO. REV. STAT. § 44-11-901(1)(a) (2018) (“Except as otherwise provided in this 
article 11, it is unlawful for a person . . . [t]o consume medical marijuana in a licensed medi-
cal marijuana center, and it shall be unlawful for a medical marijuana licensee to allow med-
ical marijuana to be consumed upon its licensed premises.”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 44-12-
901(1) (2018) (“Except as otherwise provided in this article 12, it is unlawful for a person to 
consume retail marijuana or retail marijuana products in a licensed retail marijuana estab-
lishment, and it is unlawful for a retail marijuana licensee to allow retail marijuana or retail 
marijuana products to be consumed upon its licensed premises.”). 
90  See generally Bernhard, 546 P.2d at 721; see supra text accompanying notes 54–70. 
91  See generally Zygmuntowicz v. Hospitality Invs., Inc., 828 F. Supp. 346, 348 (E.D. Pa. 
1993); see supra text accompanying notes 73–78. 
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modern choice-of-law doctrines consider legislative intent and purpose.92 That 
means that if a state legislature evidences a desire to have its statutory law ap-
plied extraterritorially, courts generally should enforce this legislative policy 
and apply the law outside state borders.93 Even if an action is filed in the non-
enacting state, those courts should still follow the legislative directive and ap-
ply the statute to the case because that is what the enacting legislature intended. 
For example, the Northern District of Illinois applied Iowa’s dram shop statute 
against an Illinois business “[i]n light of the Iowa legislature’s clear mandate 
that its Dram Shop Act is to apply prospectively and retrospectively to out-of-
state licensees.”94 As a matter of choice of law, then, Nebraska courts faithfully 
applying the Nebraska Gram Shop Act should impose liability extraterritorially, 
at least if the Nebraska legislature intended such a result and such application 
comports with the constitution;95 and non-Nebraska courts, including Colora-
do’s courts, may do so as well. 
The second fact that may distinguish the proposed dispensary liability from 
other states’ liquor liability is the high potential for in-state liability in the latter 
as compared to the former. Nebraska’s hypothetical Gram Shop Act, at least if 
it targets solely marijuana sellers (and is not part of a broader law encompass-
ing sales of other intoxicating substances, such as alcohol), would have been 
enacted with the primary purpose of capturing out-of-state sellers because no 
legal sales of marijuana transpire within the state.96 But fewer in-state applica-
                                                        
92  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1971) (in-
structing that if extraterritoriality is not “explicitly covered by statute,” the court should at-
tempt to discover what the “legislature intended”). 
93  E.g., Kunda v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 671 F.3d 464, 468 (4th Cir. 2011) (upholding application 
of New Jersey law because of the lack of express language to the contrary by Maryland’s 
legislature); Experience Hendrix LLC v. James Marshall Hendrix Found., 240 F. App’x 739, 
740 (9th Cir. 2007) (affirming use of New York law where Washington’s statute did not con-
tain any language evidencing legislative intent to apply extraterritorially); United States v. 
Ivanov, 175 F. Supp. 2d 367, 373 (D. Conn. 2001) (“[T]here is clear evidence that the statute 
was intended by Congress to apply extraterritorially. This fact is evidenced by both the plain 
language and the legislative history of each of these statutes [the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act (18 U.S.C. § 1030) Hobbs Act (18 U.S.C. § 1951), and Access Device Statute (18 
U.S.C. § 1029)]. There is a presumption that Congress intends its acts to apply only within 
the United States, and not extraterritorially. However, this ‘presumption against extraterrito-
riality’ may be overcome by showing ‘clear evidence of congressional intent to apply a stat-
ute beyond our borders.’ ”) (citation omitted). 
94  Meyers v. Kallestead, No. 91 C 20362, 1992 WL 280450, at *3–4, 6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 
1992). 
95  The constitutionality of extraterritorial application is discussed infra in Part IV. 
96  Illegal in-state sales or provision of marijuana, such as among gang members or by drug 
dealers, would more likely be handled by criminal law than the Gram Shop’s civil liability 
(though, of course, Gram Shop liability could apply to these sales as well, at least if the indi-
viduals can be found and their assets can be seized). While criminal law does not compen-
sate the injured third-party victim—except perhaps for expenses, through restitution stat-
utes—ordinary principles of tort liability would permit the injured victim to sue the drug 
user. Moreover, several states have enacted the Drug Dealer Liability Act, which makes drug 
dealers civilly liable to those injured by a driver to whom the dealer sold or provided drugs 
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tions does not imply the complete absence of in-state applications. In non-
legalizing states that have not enacted a version of the Drug Dealer Liability 
Act, the Gram Shop Act may provide a cause of action against in-state drug 
dealers and people who furnish marijuana to others (such as family members). 
In addition, the Gram Shop Act may be rolled into the state’s dram shop laws, 
which clearly apply to in-state intoxicant sales. These in-state applications en-
sure the Act is not entirely extraterritorial.97 Finally, and perhaps this argument 
is too cute, but a legislature that enacts a law that has only (or almost only) out-
of-state applicability clearly intends for such extraterritorial effect, thus 
strengthening, rather than diminishing, the case for extraterritorial application. 
A final fact serves to distinguish gram shop liability from dram shop liabil-
ity: whether the purchaser consumes the intoxicating item on the seller’s prem-
ises. But this difference, too, is not sufficiently material to dictate a different 
result from the dram shop cases and preclude all extraterritorial application. 
In states that have legalized recreational or medical marijuana, the drug 
cannot be consumed on the distributors’ premises;98 restaurants and bars, on the 
other hand, usually require the liquor they sell to be consumed at their facili-
ties.99 Thus, in a typical dram shop case, the already intoxicated person con-
                                                                                                                                
who, while under the influence of those drugs, causes an accident. See ARK. CODE ANN. 
§ 16-124-103 (2018); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11704 (West 2018); COLO. REV. 
STAT. §§ 13-21-801–13-21-813 (2018); FLA. STAT. § 772.12 (2018); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-
46 (2018); HAW. REV. STAT. § 663E-2 (2018); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 57/20 (2018); IND. 
CODE § 34-24-4-1 (2018); LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.61 (2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
§ 691.1605 (2018); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 318-C:1–318-C:18 (2018); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 2C:35B-4 (West 2018); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW §§ 12-101–12-110 (McKinney 2018); 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, §§ 2-421–2-435 (2018); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-54-10–44-54-140 
(2018); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 34-20C-1–34-20C-19 (2018); TENN. CODE. ANN. §§ 29-38-
101–29-38-116 (2018); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-37e-1–58-37e-14 (West 2018); V.I. CODE 
ANN. tit. 19, §§ 641–58 2018. A typical injured party, however, may not relish bringing a 
civil action against a known drug dealer or gang member, making the option of suing the 
drug user a more attractive one, even if not a fully compensatory one. Unlike a dispensary, 
which is easy to find and serve, a drug dealer or gang member may prove elusive. Unlike a 
dispensary, which should have seizable assets, a dealer or gang member’s finances may be 
liquid, hidden, or nonexistent. 
97  In addition, legalizing states may enact versions of the Gram Shop Act and apply these 
laws against in-state sellers. 
98  See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 44-11-901(3) (2018) (“It is unlawful for a person licensed 
pursuant to this article 11 . . . [t]o provide public premises, or any portion thereof, for the 
purpose of consumption of medical marijuana in any form . . . .”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 44-
12-901(4)(c) (2018) (“It is unlawful for any person licensed to sell retail marijuana or retail 
marijuana products pursuant to this article 12 . . . [t]o provide public premises, or any portion 
thereof, for the purpose of consumption of retail marijuana or retail marijuana products in 
any form . . . .”); WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.445(1) (2018) (“It is unlawful to . . . consume 
marijuana, useable marijuana, marijuana-infused products, or marijuana concentrates, in 
view of the general public or in a public place.”). 
99  Open container laws in most states prohibit people from carrying their drinks in public, 
including inside their cars (which would make it impossible to transport the purchased drink 
away from the bar or restaurant). See Open Container and Open Consumption of Alcohol 
State Statutes, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-servic 
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sumes alcohol on the defendant’s premises, in sight of and served by employ-
ees of the establishment. By way of contrast, in a typical Gram Shop case, the 
marijuana would be purchased on-site, but consumed elsewhere, out of sight of 
the dispensary employees. But even this distinguishing fact highlights a differ-
ence for only some dram shop cases; in those states where dram shop liability 
extends to liquor stores, as many do, the alcohol is consumed off-site, making 
such dram shop laws a more fitting analogy for the potential liability of mariju-
ana dispensaries.100 
Even so, it should be acknowledged that the location of the consumption 
proved pivotal in at least one dram shop case, and led the court to deny extra-
territorial application.101 In Goodwin v. Young, a Vermont plaintiff invoked 
New York law and sued a New York innkeeper for damages to the plaintiff’s 
mode of transportation (the plaintiff’s horse).102 The plaintiff’s employee had 
taken a team of horses to New York, drunk a single “glass of liquor at the de-
fendant’s store,” but also purchased a bottle of whiskey for consumption at a 
later time.103 After leaving the defendant’s New York establishment, the em-
ployee became intoxicated.104 Back in Vermont, the employee stabled the hors-
es, but left the barn door open, allowing in the cold air, which caused one of the 
horses to become sick and die.105 The court refused to apply the New York 
statute because no wrongful act occurred in New York.106 “The sale of liquor 
was not a wrongful act” because the employee was not clearly intoxicated at 
the time of the sale.107 Instead, “[t]he wrongful act . . . was done in Ver-
mont.”108 So too, the argument may go, the Nebraska Gram Shop Act cannot 
apply extraterritorially because the consumption did not occur on-site and so 
the dispensary workers would not know—and so could not control or influ-
                                                                                                                                
es-and-commerce/open-container-and-consumption-statutes.aspx [https://perma.cc/VSU2-E6 
SM] (last updated May 13, 2013). 
100  E.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-71 (2018) (providing “a right of action against any person who 
shall, by selling, giving, or otherwise disposing of to another, contrary to the provisions of 
law, any liquors or beverages, cause the intoxication of such person . . . .”). 
101  See Rutledge v. Rockwells of Bedford, Inc., 613 N.Y.S.2d 179, 181 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1994). 
102  Goodwin v. Young, 34 Hun. 252 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1884). 
103  Id. at 253. 
104  Id. 
105  Id. 
106  Id. at 253–54. 
107  Id. at 253. 
108  Id. at 253–54. The court also said that the statute “cannot be intended to have an extra-
territorial effect,” but that seems to be part of the reasoning as to why in this case, the New 
York statute should not apply to the Vermont injury. Id. at 254. In Rutledge v. Rockwells of 
Bedford, Inc., 613 N.Y.S.2d 179, 181 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994), the New York Appellate Divi-
sion distinguished Goodwin because, unlike in Goodwin where the tortfeasor became intoxi-
cated after leaving the defendant’s premises, the deceased in Rutledge “became intoxicated 
at the defendant’s establishment in Bedford, New York,” then left the establishment, “had an 
accident in Connecticut,” and died. Thus, the key fact in each case was whether the consum-
er drank and became intoxicated “at the innkeeper’s premises.” 
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ence—the patron’s level of intoxication, though they could control the amount 
sold to the patron.109 
But this analogy to Goodwin should fail. Not only did Goodwin subordi-
nate the law of the place of the sale to the law of the place of the injury—
meaning that Colorado’s law should take second chair to Nebraska’s because 
Nebraska is the place of the injury—but also dram shop liability as it relates to 
bars and restaurants often requires that establishments over-serve already intox-
icated individuals, meaning the location of consumption clearly matters for 
purposes of proving that element.110 After all, it would be materially more dif-
ficult to prove the defendant had any knowledge of the consumer’s level of in-
toxication if the defendant removes the alcohol and drinks it off-site. Thus, the 
fact of off-site consumption does matter, but it matters for the knowledge aspect 
of liability rather than for the extraterritorial sweep of the law.111 Precisely be-
cause of this difficulty of proof for off-site consumption, any drafted Gram 
Shop Act should not rely on the dispensary employees’ knowledge of intoxica-
tion or impairment, but should instead rely on their knowledge of selling to a 
citizen from a non-legalizing state.112 
In fact, rather than militating against the extraterritorial application of gram 
shop liability, the off-site consumption for marijuana may support a stronger 
case for extraterritorial application. Those running the dispensary certainly 
know that the marijuana will be removed from the premises and, if the dispen-
sary is close to the border of a non-legalizing state, those who sold the marijua-
na should reasonably suspect that a non-resident may take the marijuana across 
the border and consume it in the Home State, or quickly partake of the marijua-
na in a hotel room and then return, still high, to the Home State.113 These suspi-
cions are borne out by facts: states surrounding Colorado have alleged that 
                                                        
109  Note, however, that the law sought to be applied in Goodwin was New York law (the 
place of the purchase). In the Gram Shop hypothetical, the law sought to be applied is Ne-
braska law (the place of the injury and, potentially, consumption). 
110  Goodwin may simply be a case of failure of proof. The employee did become intoxicat-
ed, but it is unclear that the intoxication was a result of the defendant’s sales. That is, there is 
no proof that the defendant’s establishment sold the tortfeasor the liquor that caused him to 
become intoxicated. 
111  Dram shop acts typically require that the bar over-serve an already intoxicated individu-
al—thus requiring knowledge of the level of intoxication. The proposed Gram Shop Act, to 
the contrary, merely requires knowledge of the buyer’s domicile, not his level of intoxica-
tion. So, the location of consumption may not be material in the Gram Shop context. 
112  Even if the Gram Shop Act as enacted does require knowledge of intoxication, the Gram 
Shop Act may still perform its primary purpose—deterrence—even though liability would 
be more difficult to establish in an actual case. See Berch, supra note 20, at 885 (describing 
the deterrence value of a Gram Shop Act). 
113  See Jack Healy, Advocates in Denver, Home to Legal Marijuana, Seek Public Place to 
Smoke, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2015), www.nytimes.com/2015/09/03/us/advocates-in-denver-
home-to-legal-marijuana-seek-public-place-to-smoke.html [https://perma.cc/3TE5-AN2 
H] (discussing the fact that marijuana cannot be consumed in public places). 
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some dispensaries set up business along the border because they anticipate de-
mand from customers residing in non-legalizing states.114 
All in all, off-site consumption may make it more difficult for a plaintiff to 
prove that an establishment had knowledge of excess imbibing in the alcohol 
context, but that should not significantly affect the choice-of-law issues, partic-
ularly in the marijuana dispensary context. In fact, any proposed Gram Shop 
Act should provide for strict liability precisely because dispensary employees 
would not have an opportunity to watch patrons consume the marijuana they 
have been sold. Moreover, given that some Dram Shop Acts also apply to liq-
uor stores, where on-site consumption is prohibited, the comparison is still use-
ful. 
In sum, the similarities between dram shop liability and the proposed gram 
shop liability outweigh the differences. Courts have found it appropriate to ap-
ply dram shop liability extraterritorially. The reasoning informing extraterrito-
rial application of dram shop liability supports extraterritorial application of 
gram shop liability. 
A legislature intent on extraterritorial application should make an explicit 
statement to that effect, preferably in the text of the law, but at least in legisla-
tive history,115 because when courts apply their dram shop laws extraterritorial-
ly, they routinely rely on legislative intent.116 Conversely, when courts do not 
permit extraterritoriality, they often point to the fact that the legislature has not 
authorized such sweeping action.117 So, one easy way to bolster the likelihood 
of out-of-state application of an in-state Gram Shop Act is to have the enacting 
                                                        
114  For example, dispensaries have sprung up in Sedgwick, Colorado, just a few miles from 
the Nebraska border. See POTGUIDE.COM, https://www.coloradopotguide.com/where-to-buy-
marijuana/colorado/sedgwick/ (last visited June 20, 2018). 
115  E.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 623 (1990) 
(describing the “new textualism” of Justice Scalia who believed that a statute’s plain mean-
ing could not be overridden by legislative history). To capture those current judges and jus-
tices who agree with Justice Scalia’s view, the legislature should make an explicit statement 
of extraterritoriality in the Gram Shop Act’s text, rather than bury the statement in the legis-
lative history. 
116  Brainerd Currie, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAW 364–65 (1963) (“A prime 
advantage of [interest analysis] over traditional conflict-of-laws methodology is that, while 
inquiring specifically into the governmental policies and interests involved, it explicitly rec-
ognizes the power of the legislative branch to determine what domestic policy is and when 
domestic interests require the application of that policy.”). Elsewhere, Professor Currie ex-
plained that interest analysis “is explicitly an attempt to determine legislative purpose.” Id. at 
727. 
117  E.g., Graham v. Gen. U.S. Grant Post No. 2665, V.F.W., 248 N.E.2d 657, 660 (Ill. 1969) 
(“In the last analysis, the question of whether the Dram Shop Act should be given extraterri-
torial effect is a question of policy that is peculiarly within the province of the legislature.”); 
Wienke v. Champaign Cty. Grain Ass’n, 447 N.E.2d 1388, 1391 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (“The 
supreme court stated in Graham that any determination to give extraterritorial effect to the 
Dramshop Act should come from the legislature.”). 
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legislature explicitly request extraterritorial application in the appropriate con-
text.118 
Although many cases support the conclusion that choice-of-law rules allow 
dram shop laws to be applied against out-of-state sellers, those cases generally 
do not analyze the constitutionality of such extraterritorial application.119 The 
next Part will consider that issue and conclude that extraterritorial application 
comports with the Constitution. 
IV. EXTRATERRITORIALITY CHALLENGES 
Even assuming the victim’s hypothetical case against the out-of-state mari-
juana dispensary meets the first two hurdles of personal jurisdiction and choice 
of law explored above, three potential constitutional provisions might be in-
voked against applying the hypothetical Gram Shop Act extraterritorially: the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the dormant Com-
merce Clause.120 
A. Full Faith and Credit Clause 
The Full Faith and Credit Clause (“FFCC”) prescribes the effect that one 
state must provide another state’s laws and judgments.121 Of particular im-
portance to the present inquiry, the FFCC requires that “[f]ull [f]aith and 
[c]redit shall be given in each [s]tate to the public [a]cts . . . of every other 
[s]tate.”122 As though presaging the rise in the mid-twentieth century of the 
conflict-of-laws field, James Madison, in Federalist No. 42, commented that the 
                                                        
118  Indeed, the very language of the proposed Gram Shop Act may already accomplish this 
goal. 
119  This may suggest that extraterritorial application is not unconstitutional. See Katherine 
Florey, State Courts, State Territory, State Power: Reflections on the Extraterritoriality 
Principle in Choice of Law and Legislation, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057, 1058–59 (2009) 
(“[I]t is normally a fair assumption that, so long as a state court has personal jurisdiction 
over [a] defendant, it probably has the power to apply forum law to her actions” regardless 
of whether those actions took place outside of the state, because “we are not accustomed to 
thinking of state courts’ routine choice-of-law decisions as raising serious extraterritoriality 
problems.”). Or this may simply suggest inattention to the constitutional issues by the courts, 
by the parties, or by both. 
120  This Article addresses constitutional challenges under the U.S. Constitution. State Con-
stitutions may provide additional rights and protections. For example, Colorado’s Constitu-
tion may be more protective of the Colorado seller than the federal Constitution. This is a 
worthy and important discussion, but outside the scope of this Article. See William J. Bren-
nan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 
491 (1977). 
121  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public 
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1738 
(2012). 
122  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
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Clause would “be particularly beneficial on the borders of contiguous 
states.”123 
The Supreme Court’s analysis of how the Full Faith and Credit Clause af-
fects choice of law has fluctuated over the years.124 But in Pacific Employers, 
the Court more or less settled on an understanding of the Clause’s implications 
for the choice-of-law field.125 In that case, the Supreme Court addressed wheth-
er California could constitutionally apply its workers’ compensation laws to a 
case involving a Massachusetts company that employed a Massachusetts resi-
dent who was injured while working on a temporary assignment for the compa-
ny in California.126 Although California had some connections with the lawsuit 
because the injury occurred there, that interest paled in comparison to Massa-
chusetts’ interest in holding its business accountable and in compensating its 
citizen-victim.127 Nonetheless, the US Supreme Court upheld California’s ap-
plication of California law, citing that State’s legitimate interest in protecting 
California medical creditors.128 
As understood in the wake of Pacific Employers, the FFCC places few lim-
its on choice of law and extraterritorial application of Home State laws. As long 
as a state has some legitimate interest in the dispute, that state may, consistent 
with the FFCC, apply its law, even if another state has substantial interests.129 
In other words, the FFCC does not require a balancing; it is an on-off light 
switch without a dimmer, and any legitimate interest turns that light on and al-
lows that state to apply its laws to the dispute.130 
                                                        
123   THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 221 (James Madison). 
124  Indeed, in the middle part of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court began merging 
Full Faith and Credit analysis with Due Process analysis for choice of law purposes. See, 
e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 307 n.10 (1981) (plurality opinion) (“This 
Court has taken a similar approach in deciding choice-of-law cases under both the Due Pro-
cess Clause and the Full Faith and Credit Clause.”). This Article, however, strives to keep 
the two analyses distinct, as the FFCC focuses on the state’s interest and Due Process focus-
es on fairness and undue surprise to the defendant. See, e.g., Mark D. Rosen, State Extrater-
ritorial Powers Reconsidered, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1133, 1137–38 (2010) [hereinafter 
State Extraterritorial] (“[D]ue process primarily protects individuals from being unfairly 
subject to another state’s laws, the dormant Commerce Clause primarily protects the inter-
state system from being mucked up by inconsistent state laws, and the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause and the dual sovereignty doctrine protect different aspects of states’ sovereignty.”). 
125  Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n of Cal., 306 U.S. 493, 502 (1939). 
126  Id. at 497. 
127  Id. at 503. 
128  Id. at 501. 
129  Id. at 503 (describing Massachusetts’ interest in “safeguarding the compensation of Mas-
sachusetts employees” and California’s interest in legislating “for the bodily safety and eco-
nomic protection of employees injured within [California]”). 
130  In Hague, the Supreme Court articulated the constraint as follows: a state may apply its 
law extraterritorially as long as the state possesses a “significant contact or significant ag-
gregation of contacts, creating state interests, with the parties and the occurrence or transac-
tion.” Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 (1981) (plurality opinion). The Supreme 
Court thus repudiated its earlier view that the FFCC required a balancing or weighing of the 
states’ interests, Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935), 
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The light switch can be turned on with minimal effort. The interest deemed 
sufficient in Pacific Employers was the safety of a non-resident injured in Cali-
fornia131 and the protection of California medical creditors.132 If those interests 
allow California to apply its law to a matter otherwise centered in Massachu-
setts—where the employment contract, the employer-business, and the employ-
ee all were located—the FFCC provides only a weak constitutional restraint on 
the power of a state to apply its law extraterritorially. 
As applied to the hypothetical lawsuit against the dispensary that sold to 
Mary Jane, a court would have several legitimate reasons to find that Nebraska 
has sufficient interests to overcome any FFCC challenge to the application of 
Nebraska law. First, Nebraska has interests in this hypothetical suit that mirror 
the interests the Supreme Court found sufficient in Pacific Employers. In the 
hypothetical, the victim was driving in Nebraska when he was seriously injured 
in Nebraska; he then spent several days in a hospital in Nebraska. Nebraska 
thus provided “medical, hospital and nursing services” to the injured victim.133 
Pacific Employers suggests those services alone may fulfill the minimal interest 
standard that the FFCC imposes. But Nebraska’s interests do not stop here. 
Second, the injured victim in the hypothetical suit may be a Nebraska citi-
zen, or at least have long-term connections with Nebraska. In Pacific Employ-
ers, the injured worker was a Massachusetts domiciliary who had only tempo-
rarily relocated to California for a work assignment.134 If the injured victim in 
the hypothetical case were a Nebraska domiciliary or long-term Nebraska resi-
dent, Nebraska would have an even stronger interest in the dispute than the in-
terest shown in Pacific Employers.135 The Supreme Court has stated that the 
interest in obtaining “full compensation” for an injured victim to ensure that he 
stays “off welfare rolls” and can “meet financial obligations” is sufficient to 
                                                                                                                                
and blended the analysis of the FFCC with that of the Due Process Clause. See Hague, 449 
U.S. at 312 n.15 (“While Alaska Packers balanced the interests of California and Alaska to 
determine the full faith and credit issue, such balancing is no longer required.”). As noted 
previously, this Article analyzes the two constitutional provisions separately. See State Ex-
traterritorial, supra note 124. 
131  Pac. Emp’rs, 306 U.S. at 503. 
132  Id. at 501 (“To the extent that California is required to give full faith and credit to the 
conflicting Massachusetts statute it must be denied the right to apply in its own courts its 
own statute, constitutionally enacted in pursuance of its policy to provide compensation for 
employees injured in their employment within the state. It must withhold the remedy given 
by its own statute to its residents by way of compensation for medical, hospital and nursing 
services rendered to the injured employee, and it must remit him to Massachusetts to secure 
the administrative remedy which that state has provided. We cannot say that the full faith 
and credit clause goes so far.”). 
133  Cf. id. at 498. 
134  Id. at 497–98. 
135  Mark D. Rosen, Extraterritoriality and Political Heterogeneity in American Federalism, 
150 U. PA. L. REV. 855, 871–72 (2002) [hereinafter Extraterritoriality and Political Hetero-
geneity] (“As both a commonsense and doctrinal matter, citizenship is a significant factor for 
purposes of legitimating state regulation.”). 
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satisfy the constitutional limitations on choice of law.136 This non-fleeting rela-
tionship between the injured victim and Nebraska, then, provides a second in-
terest sufficient on its own to satisfy the FFCC; certainly, this interest in com-
bination with the interest in repaying Nebraskan medical creditors suffices to 
flip the FFCC light switch to the on position. But the interests do not stop there. 
Third, Nebraska has a more general interest in keeping its roads safe, not 
just for Nebraskans, but for everyone. By applying its Gram Shop Act against 
out-of-state sellers of marijuana, the Nebraska courts may help reduce the flow 
of marijuana into Nebraska, thus ensuring fewer DUIs and helping secure the 
safety of its roadways. 
Fourth, Nebraska has economic interests in applying its law extraterritori-
ally. The state desires to save taxpayer money allocated to highway patrol and 
provision of emergency services. If there are fewer DUIs and generally safer 
roads, Nebraska may be able to reallocate its taxpayer money elsewhere or 
even decrease taxes on its citizens. 
In sum, Nebraska’s interests in facilitating repayment of its medical credi-
tors, keeping its roads safe, saving taxpayer money, and compensating victims 
suffice to satisfy the FFCC.137 This result is not surprising. As many scholars 
have pointed out, the FFCC provides only a “weak constraint” on a court’s 
choice of law.138 But there are other challenges that may impose harsher con-
straints on the extraterritorial application of the Gram Shop Act. 
B. Due Process Clause 
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause (“DPC”) provides that 
no state may “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
cess of law.”139 While the FFCC relates to a state’s interest in the action, due 
process analysis focuses on the parties’ contacts with the state and whether the 
application of a particular state’s law would be unfair or create undue surprise 
to a party.140 In addition, courts have, at times, grafted a “quid pro quo” onto 
the analysis to ensure fairness—the party against whom the state’s law is to be 
                                                        
136  Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 319 (1981) (plurality opinion) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). 
137  Oklahoma and Nebraska sued Colorado, alleging that Colorado’s sale of marijuana to 
Oklahomans and Nebraskans undermines their “own marijuana bans, drain[s] their treasur-
ies, and plac[es] stress on their criminal justice systems.” Complaint at 3–4, Nebraska v. 
Colorado, 136 S. Ct. 1034 (2016) (No. 144). Surely, these are sufficient interests for purpos-
es of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. This litigation tactic failed when the Supreme Court 
refused to grant leave to file. See Nebraska v. Colorado, 136 S. Ct. 1034 (2016). 
138  State Extraterritorial, supra note 124, at 1135 (describing the “weak constraint” of the 
commingled Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses). 
139  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
140  See Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 404 (1930) (noting substantial contacts with 
Mexico and concluding that “[n]othing thereunder was to be done, or was in fact done, in 
Texas.”); State Extraterritorial, supra note 124, at 1137–38 (“Right now, due process pri-
marily protects individuals from being unfairly subject to another state’s laws . . . .”). 
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applied must have received something of value from that state.141 In short, the 
DPC “prohibit[s] the application of law which [is] only casually or slightly re-
lated to the litigation”142 and ensures that the application of a state’s law is 
“neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.”143 
In the hypothetical lawsuit, if the application of the proposed Gram Shop 
Act against the out-of-state dispensary is attacked on due process grounds, the 
court should have sufficient grounds to defend use of the Act, principally be-
cause of the parties’ knowledge of Nebraska’s contacts with the transaction. 
There are plenty of Nebraska contacts that would provide knowledge to the 
defendant about Nebraska’s interest in the suit and would militate against a 
finding of unfair surprise.144 First and foremost, the marijuana purchaser calls 
Nebraska home.145 When the dispensary employees checked Mary Jane’s iden-
tification, they acquired knowledge that they were interacting with, and selling 
marijuana to, a Nebraskan. Moreover, given the laws prohibiting onsite con-
sumption of marijuana, knowledge should be imputed to them that Mary Jane 
might return to her home in Nebraska after procuring marijuana at the Colorado 
dispensary, particularly if the dispensary is near the Nebraska/Colorado border. 
Any advertisements that the dispensary made that could have found their way 
into Nebraska would provide further contacts.146 In some cases, the dispensa-
ries may even place billboards along the highway.147 
                                                        
141  Dick, 281 U.S. at 410 (“[T]he Mexican corporation never was in Texas; and neither it nor 
the garnishees invoked the aid of the Texas courts or the Texas laws. The Mexican corpora-
tion was not before the court. The garnishees were brought in by compulsory process. Nei-
ther has asked favors. They ask only to be let alone.”). 
142  Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 819 (1985). 
143  Id. at 818. 
144  The reasoning that follows in this Part also goes a long way toward fulfilling the DPC’s 
personal jurisdiction framework, which requires “only that in order to subject a defendant to 
a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have cer-
tain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” Int’l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 
316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)); see also supra Part II 
(discussing why a suit against the Colorado dispensary in Nebraska comports with personal 
jurisdiction requirements). 
145  Although “nominal residence—standing alone” and a “postoccurrence change of resi-
dence to the forum State—standing alone—[is] insufficient to justify application of forum 
law,” Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 311 (1981) (plurality opinion), in this case 
Mary Jane is a Nebraska domiciliary at the time of suit and has been since before she pur-
chased marijuana from the dispensary. 
146  Other Nebraska contacts, such as the location of the accident, and witnesses, police of-
ficers, medical transport personnel, and hospital staff, do not provide the defendant 
knowledge of Nebraska’s interests at the time of the sale. These sorts of contacts are relevant 
for the FFCC analysis. See supra Section IV.A. 
147  Colorado has placed some restrictions on advertising marijuana. Of particular interest, 
dispensaries may not engage in advertising that specifically targets out-of-state consumers. 
But the regulations permit online advertising, such as websites, social media, Google Ad-
Words, and blog posts, as long as no more than 10 percent of the audience is expected to be 
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Even if the DPC contains a quid pro quo requirement to ensure fairness, 
such a requirement is met here because the Colorado dispensary does receive 
something of value from Nebraska—money and patrons.148 Given that some of 
its clients reside in Nebraska, as did Mary Jane, the business benefits from its 
relationship with Nebraska in the form of higher sales. Facing no competition 
from Nebraska dispensaries, this Colorado dispensary reaps increased revenue 
from its neighbor; therefore, it is not fundamentally unfair to subject the dis-
pensary to the potential detriments in the form of civil liability that flow from 
those gains.149 
Despite the seemingly straightforward conclusion that the DPC would not 
bar application of Nebraska law against the out-of-state marijuana dispensary, 
at least one US Supreme Court case suggests otherwise and so is worth review-
ing in some depth. In the 1975 case Bigelow v. Virginia, the Court opined that 
“[a State] possess[es] no authority to regulate the services provided in [a neigh-
boring state].”150 This language, if taken literally, does seem to halt extraterrito-
rial application of the Gram Shop Act in its tracks;151 however, for the reasons 
                                                                                                                                
younger than twenty-one. COLO. CODE REGS. §§ 212-1:1107–212-1:1108 (2018). Traditional 
print media is also permitted, such as magazines. Id. § 212-1:1106. 
148  Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 410 (1930). 
149  Cf. Watson v. Emp’rs Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954) (upholding a state’s 
extraterritorial regulation of a contract between noncitizens because of the contract’s impact 
on a citizen). 
150  Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 824 (1975). Bigelow’s statement has caused some 
judges and scholars to pause regarding the constitutionality of extraterritorial application of a 
state law. E.g., Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F.2d 600, 604 (2d Cir. 1929) (Hand, J., concurring) 
(“To pass upon the provisions for the public order of another state is, or at any rate should 
be, beyond the powers of a court; it involves the relations between the states themselves, 
with which courts are incompetent to deal, and which are intrusted [sic] to other authorities. 
It may commit the domestic state to a position which would seriously embarrass its neigh-
bor . . . . No court ought to undertake an inquiry which it cannot prosecute without determin-
ing whether those laws are consonant with its own notions of what is proper.”). In writing 
about whether, in the wake of the fictional overruling of Roe v. Wade, “the Due Process and 
Full Faith and Credit Clauses would also permit [Nebraska] to make it a crime for a Califor-
nia doctor practicing in California to abort a fetus of a [Nebraska] citizen who had traveled 
to California just to procure an abortion there,” Professor Richard Fallon has admitted he 
simply “do[es] not know.” Richard H. Fallon, Jr., If Roe Were Overruled: Abortion and the 
Constitution in a Post-Roe World, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 611, 633 (2007). Professor Fallon’s 
issue may be complicated than the marijuana hypothetical because of the criminal nature of 
the law; choice of law has always had more trepidation in applying penal laws extraterritori-
ally. 
151  An argument could be set forth that Nebraska is not directly regulating services in Colo-
rado. The Gram Shop Act does not prohibit Colorado dispensaries from selling marijuana, or 
even from selling marijuana to Nebraskans. Nor does the Act limit quantities, regulate 
strengths, or set prices. If the Colorado dispensary changes its behavior, it does so because of 
the potential for liability, not because of any direct regulation by Nebraska. But see Jessica 
Berch, A Modest Proposal for Preventing the Marijuana of Legalizing States from Being a 
Burden to Prohibitionist States, PRAWFSBLAWG (Dec. 15, 2015, 5:58 PM), Comment from 
Barry (Dec. 28, 2015, 2:47 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2015/12/a-mod 
est-proposal-for-preventing-the-marijuana-of-legalizing-states-from-being-a-burden-to-prohi 
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discussed below, this single sentence should not (and does not) receive much, if 
any, weight. 
Jeffrey C. Bigelow, director and managing editor of the Virginia Weekly, 
ran an advertisement that announced that New York clinics provided low-cost 
abortions.152 That advertisement caused Mr. Bigelow to be charged with, and 
later convicted of, violating a Virginia statute that made it a misdemeanor “by 
the sale or circulation of any publication . . . [to] encourage or prompt the pro-
curing of [an] abortion.”153 The Virginia appellate courts affirmed his convic-
tion, despite Mr. Bigelow’s arguments that the statute violated his First 
Amendment rights.154 
The Supreme Court accepted certiorari and reversed Mr. Bigelow’s convic-
tion on First Amendment grounds.155 The Virginia courts had wrongly held that 
the advertisement received no First Amendment protections.156 The advertise-
ment, while commercial, “conveyed information of potential interest and value 
to a diverse audience—not only to readers possibly in need of the services of-
fered, but also to those with a general curiosity about, or genuine interest in, the 
subject matter or the law of another State.”157 Thus, Mr. Bigelow’s “First 
Amendment interests coincided with the constitutional interests of the general 
public.”158 Although the Court had disposed of the case on this First Amend-
ment issue, the Justices continued, putting forth the troubling sentiment that no 
authority exists to support the regulation of services provided in a neighboring 
state.159 Clearly, then, that sentence is dictum because the Supreme Court had 
already reasoned to the reversal of Mr. Bigelow’s conviction by concluding that 
the Virginia criminal statute violated his First Amendment Rights.160 No more 
needed to be said. 
Additionally, the statute at issue in Bigelow regulated in-state actions in 
Virginia—the publication of advertisements in Virginia encouraging the pro-
curement of abortions out-of-state—not the out-of-state abortion services them-
selves.161 Thus, the Court did not need to opine that “Virginia possess[es] no 
authority to regulate the services provided in New York.”162 Since that was not 
                                                                                                                                
biti.html#comments [https://perma.cc/LG8A-UC5Q ] (noting that the possibility of civil 
penalties changes behavior and thus is a direct regulation). Surely, though, Nebraska’s law is 
not as direct as, for example, attempting to prohibit Colorado dispensaries from selling mari-
juana to Nebraskans. 
152  Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 811–12. 
153  Id. at 812–13. 
154  Id. at 814. 
155  Id. at 829. 
156  Id. at 818. 
157  Id. at 822. 
158  Id. 
159  Id. at 824. 
160  Id. at 825. 
161  Id. at 811. 
162  Id. at 824. 
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what Virginia was doing, the Court had no need, and indeed no authority, to 
pass on the issue.163 
Even if the sentence were not double dictum (unnecessary given the 
Court’s disposition and unwise given the actual issues in the case), it likely 
does not apply to the Gram Shop Act in any event. Bigelow concerned the con-
stitutionality of a criminal law making it a misdemeanor in Virginia to encour-
age the procuring of an abortion.164 Unlike Virginia’s law, Nebraska’s Gram 
Shop Act imposes civil, not criminal, liability. The extraterritorial application 
of criminal law has always been more problematic than similar application of 
civil law.165 
Assuming that the language from Bigelow is dictum166 or distinguishable, 
the DPC’s restrictions on choice of law are quite humble.167 As Professor 
Rosen states, “[S]tates have a legitimate interest in their citizens’ out-of-state 
activities to support the conclusion that states have presumptive extraterritorial 
regulatory authority under the Due Process Clause, Bigelow notwithstand-
ing.”168 Unless Bigelow’s dictum becomes binding in a later case, the DPC does 
not preclude the extraterritorial application of Nebraska’s Gram Shop Act un-
der the facts presented in the hypothetical. As the Supreme Court has made 
clear, “A person who sets in motion in one [S]tate the means by which injury is 
inflicted in another may, consistently with the due process clause, be made lia-
ble for that injury.”169 
One final hurdle remains to be cleared before the Gram Shop Act can be 
applied extraterritorially—the dormant Commerce Clause. 
                                                        
163  Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America and 
Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial State Legislation, 85 MICH. L. 
REV. 1865, 1907 (1987) (“In his opinion for the Court in Bigelow v. Virginia, Justice 
Blackmun asserts that Virginia cannot prevent its residents from traveling to New York to 
obtain services that are legal in New York. This assertion is not entitled to any significant 
weight. The immediate problem in Bigelow was not an attempt by Virginia to forbid its citi-
zens from traveling to New York to receive abortion referral services.”); Mark D. Rosen, 
“Hard” or “Soft” Pluralism?: Positive, Normative, and Institutional Considerations of 
States’ Extraterritorial Powers, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 713, 723–24 (2007) [hereinafter 
“Hard” or “Soft” Pluralism] (“First, the language from Bigelow was dicta . . . . Second, in 
Professor Fallon’s words, Bigelow’s ‘categorical claim that states may never enact or enforce 
extraterritorial criminal legislation seems too strong.’ . . . . Third, post-Bigelow case law has 
limited Bigelow’s dictum.”). 
164  Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 811. 
165  See Fallon, supra note 150 at 629. Even if the Gram Shop Act were criminal, Professor 
Fallon points out that “the categorical claim that states may never enact or enforce extraterri-
torial criminal legislation seems too strong.” Id. 
166  See supra notes 162–63 and accompanying text. 
167  “Hard” or “Soft” Pluralism, supra note 163, at 719 (explaining that the Supreme Court 
has “endorsed extraterritorial powers” by the states “since the beginning of our nation’s his-
tory”). 
168  Id. at 725. 
169  Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253, 258 (1933). 
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C. Dormant Commerce Clause 
The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power “[t]o regulate Com-
merce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian 
Tribes.”170 Although framed as an affirmative grant of power to Congress, the 
US Supreme Court has held that the Commerce Clause, by extension, also bars 
states from enacting legislation that interferes with the free flow of com-
merce.171 This is the so-called dormant Commerce Clause (“DCC”). 
The Supreme Court has set forth three different types of state laws that 
may run afoul of the DCC.172 First, the Court has announced a virtual per se 
bar against protectionist state laws; these laws may be upheld only if they ad-
vance legitimate state purposes that cannot be served by reasonable nondis-
criminatory alternatives173 and must pass the “strictest scrutiny.”174 These laws 
are virtually always unconstitutional because 
“[i]f [a state], in order to promote the economic welfare of her [industries], may 
guard them against competition with the cheaper prices of [a sister state], the 
door has been opened to rivalries and reprisals that were meant to be averted by 
subjecting commerce between the states to the power of the nation.”175 
Professor DeVeaux calls this the “anti-protectionist function” of the DCC, and I 
adopt his nomenclature here.176 
New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach provides an example of an anti-
protectionist law.177 Ohio awarded tax credits for ethanol, but only if the etha-
nol was produced in Ohio or in a state that provided similar tax benefits to eth-
anol produced in Ohio.178 The reciprocity provision left a certain Indiana pro-
ducer ineligible for the credit.179 The Supreme Court made short work of the 
case. Finding the Ohio statute “on its face” violated “the cardinal requirement 
of nondiscrimination,” the Court struck it down.180 
                                                        
170  U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. 
171  S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 87 (1984) (“Although the Com-
merce Clause is by its text an affirmative grant of power to Congress to regulate interstate 
and foreign commerce, the Clause has long been recognized as a self-executing limitation on 
the power of the States to enact laws imposing substantial burdens on such commerce.”) (ci-
tations omitted). 
172  Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1171 (10th Cir. 2015) (“On the usual 
telling, dormant commerce clause cases are said to come in three varieties.”). 
173  City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978). 
174  Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 345 (1996). 
175  Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935). 
176  Chad DeVeaux, Lost in the Dismal Swamp: Interstate Class Actions, False Federalism, 
and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 1005 (2011) [hereinafter 
Lost in the Dismal Swamp]. 
177  New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273–74 (1988). 
178  Id. at 271. 
179  Id. at 273. 
180  Id. at 274. 
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Second, the DCC “precludes the application of a state statute to commerce 
that takes place wholly outside of the State’s borders, whether or not the com-
merce has effects within the State.”181 A State “has no power to project its leg-
islation into” another state.182 This extraterritorial strand of the DCC also re-
ceives strict scrutiny, and laws that fall under its ambit usually fail to pass 
constitutional muster.183 Professor DeVeaux calls this aspect of the DCC its 
“sovereign-capacity function.”184 
An example of this second type of law comes from Brown-Forman Distill-
ers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority.185 At issue was New York’s Al-
coholic Beverage Control Law, which required distributors within New York to 
sell liquor at a price no higher than the lowest price the distributor charged in 
any other state.186 The parties agreed that New York’s law “regulates all distill-
ers of intoxicating liquors evenhandedly,” and therefore did not run afoul of the 
protectionist prohibitions espoused by the DCC.187 Nonetheless, the Supreme 
Court held the law unconstitutional, reasoning that “[w]hen a state statute di-
rectly regulates or discriminates against interstate commerce, or when its effect 
is to favor in-state economic interests over out-of-state interests, we have gen-
erally struck down the statute without further inquiry.”188 New York’s price af-
firmation statute failed this test by “[f]orcing a merchant to seek regulatory ap-
proval in [New York] before undertaking a transaction in another [state].”189 
New York thus “project[ed] its legislation into other States.”190 Because the 
“practical effect” of New York’s price affirmation statute “control[led] liquor 
prices in other states,” the Court struck down the law as a violation of the sov-
ereign-capacity function of the DCC.191 
Third, the DCC prohibits state regulation that unduly burdens interstate 
commerce in areas where uniformity is essential.192 These laws are subjected to 
a balancing test, which they almost always survive.193 The Court has described 
the governing test this way: “[w]here [a state] statute regulates even-handedly 
to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate 
                                                        
181  Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989). See also BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 
517 U.S. 559, 572–73 (1996); CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 93 
(1987); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 582–83 
(1986); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642 (1982) (plurality). 
182  Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521 (1935). 
183  Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 476 U.S. at 579. 
184  Lost in the Dismal Swamp, supra note 176, at 1006. 
185  Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 476 U.S. at 573. 
186  Id. at 575. 
187  Id. at 579. 
188  Id. (citations omitted). 
189  Id. at 582. 
190  Id. at 584 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
191  Id. at 583. 
192  Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 377 (1946). 
193  Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
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commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on 
such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”194 
This aspect of the DCC fulfills what Professor DeVeaux termed the “anti-
obstructionist function.”195 
The most widely cited example of the anti-obstructionist function of the 
DCC comes from Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona,196 which involves one of the 
very few state laws that has failed the forgiving balancing test.197 For alleged 
safety reasons, Arizona limited the number of passenger cars on any train to 
fourteen and freight cars to seventy.198 Because other states did not limit the 
number of cars, Arizona’s law had the effect of requiring surrounding states to 
limit the number of cars on their trains that would come to or pass through Ari-
zona, impairing the uninterrupted travel of the trains by requiring trains to be 
broken up when they reached the Arizona border.199 This added service cost the 
two railroads traversing the state an additional $1,000,000 per year.200 The 
Court subjected this incidental interstate regulation to the balancing test and 
struck down the law because the burden on interstate commerce was “serious,” 
while the alleged safety benefits were speculative.201 In fact, the Court found 
that the law had a deleterious effect on railway safety: the “increased danger of 
accident and personal injury as may result from the greater length of trains is 
more than offset by the increase in the number of accidents resulting from the 
larger number of trains when train lengths are reduced.”202 Arizona’s law failed 
to survive the balancing test because its law, rather than improving safety, 
harmed it. 
The most serious DCC challenge to the Gram Shop Act is that its extrater-
ritorial application may run afoul of the sovereign-capacity function (the sec-
ond of the three functions described above); the Gram Shop Act may also be 
                                                        
194  Id. 
195  Lost in the Dismal Swamp, supra note 176, at 1006. 
196  S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945). 
197  Two other Supreme Court cases struck down state laws under this branch of the DCC. In 
Morgan v. Virginia, the Supreme Court struck down a Virginia statute that required passen-
gers on interstate buses driving through Virginia to be racially segregated. Morgan, 328 U.S. 
at 374. Other states, however, forbade racial segregation. Id. at 382. The Virginia statute thus 
required passengers to change seats at Virginia’s borders, causing “disturb[ance]” of the pas-
sengers. Id. at 381. Noting the need for a “uniform rule to promote and protect national trav-
el,” the Court found the Virginia statute unconstitutional. Id. at 386; see also Bibb v. Navajo 
Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 520 (1959) (striking down an Illinois statute requiring cer-
tain mud flaps because it imposed an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce). Interest-
ingly, the concurrence in Bibb noted that the mud flaps required by Illinois actually “cre-
ate[d] certain safety hazards,” and thus were not a “necessary, appropriate, or helpful local 
safety measure.” Id. at 530 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
198  S. Pac. Co., 325 U.S. at 763. 
199  Id. at 773. 
200  Id. at 772. 
201  Id. at 775. 
202  Id. 
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attacked on anti-obstructionist grounds (the last of the functions described 
above), but the test there is easy to meet. The Act cannot seriously be described 
as protecting state industry (the first function), as there is no marijuana industry 
in Nebraska to protect.203 
As a preliminary matter, the sovereign-capacity strand of the DCC pro-
vides a hurdle only if the doctrine persists. While sitting on the Tenth Circuit, 
now-Justice Gorsuch called it “the most dormant doctrine in dormant com-
merce clause jurisprudence.”204 Other members of the Supreme Court have 
similarly viewed the doctrine with skepticism. Justice Thomas refuses to apply 
the DCC to strike down state laws, a position he has held since at least 1997.205 
In May 2015, Justice Thomas once again refused to wield the DCC ax to strike 
down a state tax law, stating that the DCC “has no basis in the text of the Con-
stitution, makes little sense, and has proved virtually unworkable in application, 
and, consequently, cannot serve as a basis for striking down a state statute.”206 
Just before his death, Justice Scalia characterized the entire dormant Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence as “a judicial fraud,” entirely unfounded in the 
text.207 He complained that the DCC is “utterly illogical” because it “enables 
States to enact laws that would otherwise constitute impermissible burdens up-
on interstate commerce” as long as Congress consents.208 
Justice Gorsuch, while serving on the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
ruled in July 2015 that the sovereign-capacity function is “no more than [an] 
instantiation[] of the Philadelphia anti-discrimination rule.”209 Of particular in-
terest for our purposes, Justice Gorsuch upheld Colorado’s indirect regulation 
of Nebraska’s coal-power industry (while in our hypothetical, we are grappling 
                                                        
203  If Nebraska were to legalize medical or recreational marijuana, the Gram Shop Act 
would apply to these in-state businesses as well. 
204  Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1170 (10th Cir. 2015). 
205  Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 609–10 (1997) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). 
206  Comptroller of Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1811 (2015) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
207  Id. at 1808 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
208  Id. 
209  Energy & Env’t Legal Inst., 793 F.3d at 1173. In fact, Justice Gorsuch’s skepticism re-
garding the DCC received some consideration in the press during nomination proceedings. 
See, e.g., Vidya Kauri, Gorsuch May Bring Change to Tax on Out-of-State Sales, LAW360 
(Feb. 2, 2017, 9:02 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/887648/gorsuch-may-bring-chan 
ge-to-tax-on-out-of-state-sales [https://perma.cc/LQ2D-3TQC]; Ramesh Ponnuru, Where 
Neil Gorsuch Stands on Three Legal Issues That Divide Conservatives, DENVER POST (Feb. 
1, 2017, 10:04 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/2017/02/01/where-neil-gorsuch-stands-on-
three-legal-issues-that-divide-conservatives/ [https://perma.cc/2T5L-S2HP]; Kevin Russell, 
Judge Gorsuch on Separation of Powers and Federalism, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 15, 2017, 
3:22 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/03/judge-gorsuch-separation-powers-federalism 
[https://perma.cc/CH8Y-SRRC] (Justice Gorsuch “has shown some skepticism of the so-
called ‘dormant commerce clause’ doctrine.”). 
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with Nebraska’s potential indirect regulation of Colorado’s weed industry).210 
Then-Judge Gorsuch urged that there is no discrimination unless the state en-
acts “price control or price affirmation statutes that involve tying the price of 
. . . in-state products to out-of-state prices.”211 Otherwise, “wouldn’t we have to 
strike down state health and safety regulations that require out-of-state manu-
facturers to alter their designs or labels?”212 But courts do not strike down those 
laws, because they have tacitly come to realize that the sovereign-capacity 
function of the DCC carries no independent weight. 
A growing consensus has emerged among judges that the DCC prohibits 
only economic protectionism (if the doctrine has any role to play at all).213 As 
one judge put it, “the extraterritoriality doctrine . . . is a relic of the old world 
with no useful role to play in the new.”214 In dictum or dissent,215 various judg-
es have posited that states may enforce non-protectionist laws that regulate out-
of-state conduct if that conduct “affects a substantial number of in-state resi-
dents,”216 at least as long as “the burden imposed” on interstate commerce is 
not “clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”217 In other 
words, rather than applying the virtual per se bar of the sovereign-capacity 
function, these courts are incorporating the balancing test from the anti-
obstructionist function—the test that virtually all state laws pass.218 
These views enjoy widespread support in the academic community.219 Pro-
fessor Fallon agrees that the sovereign-capacity function prohibits only eco-
                                                        
210  See Chad DeVeaux, One Toke Too Far: The Demise of the Dormant Commerce Clause’s 
Extraterritoriality Doctrine Threatens the Marijuana-Legalization Experiment, 58 B.C. L. 
REV. 953, 958–59 (2017) [hereinafter One Toke Too Far] (noting the humor of the flipped 
positions for Nebraska and Colorado). 
211  Energy & Env’t Legal Inst., 793 F.3d at 1174–75 (alteration in original) (quoting Pharm. 
Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 669 (2003)). 
212  Id. at 1175. 
213  Id. at 1173 (explaining that the Supreme Court has struck down laws under the sover-
eign-capacity function only when they involve “price control or price affirmation regulation” 
that “link[] in-state prices to those charged elsewhere, with . . . the effect of raising costs for 
out-of-state consumers or rival businesses.”); Ass’n des Eleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du 
Quebec v. Harris, 729 F.3d 937, 951 (9th Cir. 2013) (stating that the extraterritoriality prohi-
bition encompasses only “price control or price affirmation statutes”); Am. Beverage Ass’n 
v. Snyder, 700 F.3d 796, 812 (6th Cir. 2012) (Sutton, J., concurring). 
214  Am. Beverage Ass’n, 700 F.3d at 812 (Sutton, J., concurring). 
215  E.g., Harris, 729 F.3d at 951 (noting that the extraterritoriality prohibition is limited to 
“price control or affirmation statutes”); Am. Beverage Ass’n, 700 F.3d at 812 (Sutton, J., 
concurring). 
216  IMS Health Inc. v. Mills, 616 F.3d 7, 44 (1st Cir. 2010), vacated sub nom. IMS Health 
Inc. v. Schneider, 564 U.S. 1051 (2011) (mem.). 
217  E.g., id. at 42 n.51 (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)). 
218  Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. 
219  E.g., Brannon P. Denning, Extraterritoriality and the Dormant Commerce Clause: A 
Doctrinal Post-Mortem, 73 LA. L. REV. 979, 979–80 (2013) (The extraterritoriality doctrine 
“is dead, and unlikely to be revived by the current [Supreme] Court.”); Fallon, supra note 
150, at 638 (“In condemning extraterritorial regulation as impermissible under the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court has typically spoken in contexts involving what it 
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nomic protectionism.220 Professor Denning goes a step further and proclaims 
the extraterritoriality doctrine “dead.”221 
With all of these esteemed justices, judges, and scholars questioning the vi-
tality of the DCC in general and the sovereign-capacity function in particular, 
even Professor DeVeaux, a staunch supporter of both the DCC and its limita-
tions on extraterritoriality, admits that the sovereign-capacity function provides 
leeway to the states, generally permitting incidental regulation of extraterritori-
al commerce.222 Otherwise, most, if not all, of the cases explored in Part III ap-
plying in-state laws against out-of-state businesses would have had to conclude 
that the extraterritorial application was unconstitutional; but they did not. Oth-
erwise, scores of cases involving state laws other than dram shop acts that are 
applied extraterritorially would also be inconsistent with the Constitution; but 
they have not been declared unconstitutional.223 And states would not need a 
presumption against extraterritorial application224 because there would, instead, 
                                                                                                                                
calls economic protectionism . . . .”); Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, The Internet and 
the Dormant Commerce Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785, 789–90 (2001) (The prohibition against 
extraterritorial regulation “is clearly too broad,” and “[s]cores of state laws validly apply to 
and regulate extrastate commercial conduct that produces harmful local effects.”); Regan, 
supra note 163, at 1908 (“Why should we not think of a state as having an interest in its citi-
zens which justifies regulation of their conduct wherever they may be?”); Extraterritoriality 
and Political Heterogeneity, supra note 135, at 863 (“[S]tates have a presumptive power to 
regulate their citizens’ extraterritorial conduct.”); Dormant Commerce Clause—
Extraterritoriality Doctrine—Sixth Circuit Invalidates Michigan Statute Requiring Bottle 
Manufacturers to Use Unique Mark on all Bottles Sold within Michigan—American Bever-
age Ass’n v. Snyder, 700 F.3d 796 (6th Cir. 2012), 126 HARV. L. REV. 2435, 2442 (2013) 
(“[A] mechanical application of a territorial principle inhibits state experimentation with 
laws that attempt to solve their social and economic problems.”). 
220  Fallon, supra note 150, at 638. 
221  Denning, supra note 219, at 980. 
222  Lost in the Dismal Swamp, supra note 176, at 1008. 
223  For example, CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am. would be wrongly decided. At issue 
in CTS was an Indiana statute that required a majority of the preexisting shareholders to ap-
prove a change in control of certain corporations chartered in Indiana (with a requisite num-
ber of shareholders or shares in Indiana) and that had not opted out of the statute’s purview. 
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 72–73 (1987). The plaintiffs argued the 
Indiana law was unconstitutional because it regulated beyond its borders noting that “[t]he 
fact that the burden of a state regulation falls on some interstate companies does not, by it-
self, establish a claim of discrimination against interstate commerce.” Id. at 88 (quoting 
Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 126 (1978)). Where “the primary purpose” 
of the statute was to protect in-state shareholders and in-state corporations, the Supreme 
Court upheld the Indiana statute. Id. at 91. Had there been a rule against extraterritorial ef-
fects, the Court would have struck down this Indiana statute. See also In re Jevne, 387 B.R. 
301, 306 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008) (permitting Rhode Island’s homestead exemption to apply 
to Florida land). 
224  E.g., State Sur. Co. v. Lensing, 249 N.W.2d 608, 612 (Iowa 1977) (“We cannot ignore 
the general rule that a state’s statutes are presumed not to have extraterritorial effect.”). Simi-
larly, the Supreme Court’s presumption that congressional statutes cannot be applied outside 
the United States unless Congress has clearly indicated that the statute does apply extraterri-
torially would be suspect. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010). 
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be a rule against extraterritorial application—that rule being constitutionally 
mandated through the sovereign-capacity function of the DCC. 
But perhaps most importantly, if the extraterritoriality doctrine struck down 
all statutes having out-of-state effects, states would be left without an effective 
remedy to combat harm foisted upon them by their neighbors. Consider this 
very problem of marijuana spillover. Unlike our national borders—where the 
Fourth Amendment permits customs checks without any individualized suspi-
cion225—state borders cannot have checkpoints with the primary purpose to 
search for drugs.226 So, if a non-legalizing state wants to keep its non-drug pol-
icy while also stemming the flow of marijuana inside its borders, the state will 
need to either engage in litigation against the legalizing state,227 increase crimi-
nal penalties for trafficking to a level high enough to deter would-be traffickers 
from bringing marijuana back into the non-legalizing state, or enact statutes 
(like the Gram Shop Act) encouraging those in the legalizing state to offset the 
cost of the spillover effects. Currently, the litigation route seems to be flounder-
ing;228 and increasing criminal penalties when drug crimes are already heavily 
penalized seems overly harsh, particularly given the discriminatory enforce-
ment of drug laws against minority populations.229 That leaves open to the le-
galizing state the option of enacting civil liability laws. An expansive reading 
of the extraterritoriality principle in the DCC would close off this option as 
well, forcing upon non-legalizing states three unpalatable choices: (1) do noth-
ing and keep the (harmful) status quo; (2) remain opposed to marijuana and 
suffer the harms from the neighboring states while potentially increasing crimi-
nal penalties for possession and trafficking; or (3) legalize marijuana so that the 
formerly anti-marijuana state, too, benefits financially from marijuana sales. 
If instead of the overly expansive view of the DCC, which precludes an in-
state statute from applying to out-of-state commerce, the balancing test from 
Pike is used (as some lower courts have begun to do), the extraterritorial appli-
cation of the Gram Shop Act should pass constitutional muster.230 The balanc-
ing test permits states to enforce non-protectionist laws that regulate out-of-
state conduct as long as “the burden imposed” on interstate commerce is not 
“clearly excessive in relation to the local benefits.”231 This has been likened to 
                                                        
225  See U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 545 (1976) (upholding fixed border patrol 
checkpoints). 
226  See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41–42 (2000) (holding that drug inter-
diction checkpoints violate the Fourth Amendment). 
227  See Chad DeVeaux & Anne Mostad-Jensen, Fear and Loathing in Colorado: Invoking 
the Supreme Court’s State-Controversy Jurisdiction to Challenge the Marijuana-
Legalization Experiment, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1829, 1871–72 (2015) (setting forth a common-law 
nuisance theory). 
228  See Berch, supra note 20, at 873–76. 
229  Id. at 877. 
230  Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
231  IMS Health Inc. v. Mills, 616 F.3d 7, 42 n.51 (1st Cir. 2010), vacated sub nom. IMS 
Health Inc. v. Schneider, 564 U.S. 1051 (2011) (mem.) (quoting Pike, 397 U.S. at 142). Sim-
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rational-basis scrutiny: “we consider whether the legislature had a rational basis 
for believing there was a legitimate purpose that would be advanced by the 
statute. We likewise apply a deferential standard in identifying a statute’s puta-
tive benefits.”232 
The Gram Shop Act passes this test. Although the Act is hypothetical, we 
can surmise many legitimate purposes for such a statute. Enacting gram shop 
legislation expresses moral condemnation of drug use and drug culture; protects 
Nebraskans from the harmfulness of both long-term and short-term drug use; 
decreases the number of car accidents and related injuries to Nebraska resi-
dents; reduces the likelihood of certain crimes such as disorderly conduct, ve-
hicular manslaughter, and DUIs; conserves police and judicial resources; safe-
guards the state’s roads; and helps shield residents from observing drug use or 
its effects. Given these numerous and weighty interests and the deference given 
to states under this rational-basis-type review, it appears extraordinarily unlike-
ly that any court would find the burden on commerce “clearly excessive” in 
comparison to these purposes. Even Professor DeVeaux agrees that the hypo-
thetical Gram Shop Act survives a challenge brought under the DCC.233 
In sum, Nebraska’s Gram Shop Act should survive a DCC challenge, at 
least as long as the court does not apply the sweeping language found in a few 
cases espousing the sovereign-capacity function. 
CONCLUSION 
Scholars are calling the legalization of marijuana at the state level for med-
ical and recreational purposes, while it remains illegal at the federal level, “one 
of the most important federalism conflicts in a generation.”234 Currently, states 
that have rejected marijuana legalization nonetheless must bear some of the 
                                                                                                                                
ilarly, in his Article, Making Sense of Extraterritoriality: Why California’s Progressive 
Global Warming and Animal Welfare Legislation Does Not Violate the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, Jeffrey Schmitt argues that “a state regulation of in-state conduct violates the extra-
territoriality principle only when the regulation: (1) lacks a corresponding in-state interest; 
and (2) inescapably has the practical effect of regulating conduct beyond the state’s bor-
ders.” Jeffrey M. Schmitt, Making Sense of Extraterritoriality: Why California’s Progressive 
Global Warming and Animal Welfare Legislation Does Not Violate the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, 39 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 423, 425 (2015). That test, while not precisely mirroring 
the Pike balancing test, does have some of its attributes, including the requirement of an in-
state “benefit,” and only “incidental” out-of-state regulation. 
232  Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Jim’s Motorcycle, Inc., 401 F.3d 560, 569 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing 
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 62–93 (1987)). 
233  One Toke Too Far, supra note 210, at 990 (“[A] Nebraska statute punishing Colorado 
dispensaries that sell pot to consumers they know or have reason to know are Huskers would 
not subject vendors to ‘unfair surprise’ or impose ‘clearly excessive’ burdens on interstate 
commerce.”) (emphasis omitted). 
234  Chemerinsky et al., supra note 11, at 77; see also David S. Schwartz, High Federalism: 
Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 567, 569 (2013) (“Marijuana legalization by the states presents the most pressing and 
complex federalism issue of our time.”). 
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negative consequences flowing from legalization and accrue none of the bene-
fits, such as increased tax and tourism revenue and increased employment op-
portunities. But that does not have to remain the status quo. 
Non-legalizing states that are committed to remaining pot-free may enact 
Gram Shop Acts to impose liability against out-of-state dispensaries that sell to 
in-state citizens who cause harm to the Home State. If the injured victim sues in 
the non-legalizing state, the Home State court should accept personal jurisdic-
tion over the out-of-state defendant dispensary and apply its Gram Shop Act, 
even if no such liability exists in the dispensary’s state of origin. Such extrater-
ritorial application of the law should be upheld as constitutional against any 
challenges based on FFCC, DPC, or DCC. 
